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Platforms, the First Amendment and Online Speech: 
Regulating the Filters 
 
Sofia Grafanaki* 
 
Abstract 
 
In recent years, online platforms have given rise to multiple 
discussions about what their role is, what their role should be, 
and whether they should be regulated.  The complex nature of 
these private entities makes it very challenging to place them in 
a single descriptive category with existing rules.  In today’s 
information environment, social media platforms have become a 
platform press by providing hosting as well as navigation and 
delivery of public expression, much of which is done through 
machine learning algorithms.  This article argues that there is a 
subset of algorithms that social media platforms use to filter 
public expression, which can be regulated without constitutional 
objections.  A distinction is drawn between algorithms that 
curate speech for hosting purposes and those that curate for 
navigation purposes, and it is argued that content navigation 
algorithms, because of their function, deserve separate 
constitutional treatment.  By analyzing the platforms’ functions 
independently from one another, this paper constructs a doctrinal 
and normative framework that can be used to navigate some of 
the complexity. 
The First Amendment makes it problematic to interfere with 
how platforms decide what to host because algorithms that 
implement content moderation policies perform functions 
analogous to an editorial role when deciding whether content 
should be censored or allowed on the platform.  Content 
navigation algorithms, on the other hand, do not face the same 
doctrinal challenges; they operate outside of the public discourse 
 
* Sofia Grafanaki researches the personal and social implications of new 
technologies. She focuses on the desirability and possibility of their democratic 
supervision. The author has worked extensively with startups in the Big Data 
space, holds two L.L.M. degrees from NYU School of Law, an M.B.A. from 
Columbia Business School, and a law degree from Oxford University. She is 
admitted to practice law in New York, London, and Athens. 
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as mere information conduits and are thus not subject to core 
First Amendment doctrine.  Their function is to facilitate the flow 
of information to an audience, which in turn participates in 
public discourse; if they have any constitutional status, it is 
derived from the value they provide to their audience as a delivery 
mechanism of information. 
This article asserts that we should regulate content 
navigation algorithms to an extent.  They undermine the notion 
of autonomous choice in the selection and consumption of content, 
and their role in today’s information environment is not aligned 
with a functioning marketplace of ideas and the prerequisites for 
citizens in a democratic society to perform their civic duties.  The 
paper concludes that any regulation directed to content 
navigation algorithms should be subject to a lower standard of 
scrutiny, similar to the standard for commercial speech. 
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Introduction 
 
In February 2018, Facebook and Instagram were singled out 
by the Justice Department, more than any other technological 
tool, as critical to Russian efforts to influence the 2016 
2https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol39/iss1/3
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Presidential Election.1  Facebook handed over to Congress more 
than 3,000 ads that were purchased by the Russian troll farm 
known as the Internet Research Agency,2 which, according to the 
company, reached eleven million of its users.3 Research however 
indicates, that the organic reach of the Russian-controlled 
accounts was dramatically bigger; Facebook users may have 
been exposed to such content hundreds of millions, or perhaps 
billions, of times.4  Shortly after the election, a news analysis 
found that during the last few months of the US Presidential 
campaign, the top-performing fake news stories on Facebook 
generated more engagement than the top stories from major 
news outlets.5  On April 10th and 11th of 2018, Facebook CEO 
 
1.  Sheera Frenkel & Katie Benner, To Stir Discord in 2016, Russians 
Turned Most Often to Facebook, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 17, 2018), https://www. 
nytimes.com/2018/02/17/technology/indictment-russian-tech-facebook.html. 
2.  See generally Adrian Chen, The Agency, N.Y. TIMES MAG., June 2, 2015, 
at 57; Neil MacFarquhar, Inside the Russian Troll Factory: Zombies and a 
Breakneck Pace, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 2018, at A11; Mike Isaac & Scott Shane, 
Facebook to Deliver 3,000 Russia-Linked Ads to Congress on Monday, N.Y. 
TIMES (Oct. 1, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/01/technology 
/facebook-russia-ads.html; see also Dylan Byers, Facebook Handed Russia-
Linked Ads Over to Mueller Under Search Warrant, CNN BUS. (Sept. 17, 2017, 
11:29 AM), https://money.cnn.com/2017/09/15/media/facebook-mueller-
ads/index.html?sr=fbCNN091517facebook-mueller-ads0907PMStoryLink 
&fbclid=IwAR3C0D5OQteU9ogfkny_loixjJNDCrRhToQc2DRwYCrcEMcBxlT
Ho2rm4p4; Benjamin Siegel, Facebook Turns Over Thousands of Russia-
Linked Ads to Congress, ABC NEWS (Oct 2, 2017, 5:04 PM), https://abcnews 
.go.com/Politics/facebook-turns-thousands-russia-linked-ads-
congress/story?id=50226525. 
3.  Facebook, Social Media Privacy, and the Use and Abuse of Data: 
Hearing Before the U.S. S. Comm. on the Judiciary and the U.S. S. Comm. on 
Commerce, Sci. and Transp., 115th Cong. 5 (2018) (testimony of Mark 
Zuckerberg, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, Facebook), 
https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/04-10-
18%20Zuckerberg%20Testimony.pdf. 
4.  Craig Timberg, Russian Propaganda May Have Been Shared 
Hundreds of Millions of Times, New Research Says, WASH. POST (Oct. 5, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2017/10/05/rus sian-
propaganda-may-have-been-shared-hundreds-of-millions-of-times-new-
research-says/?utm_term=.ffb82f4fe621; see generally Itemized Posts and 
Historical Engagement - 6 Now-Closed FB Page, TABLEAU PUB., https://public 
.tableau.com/profile/d1gi#!/vizhome/FB4/TotalReachbyPag (last updated Oct. 
5, 2017). 
5.  Craig Silverman, This Analysis Shows How Viral Fake Election News 
Stories Outperformed Real News on Facebook, BUZZFEED NEWS (Nov. 16, 2016, 
5:15 PM), https://www.buzzfeed.com/craigsilverman/viral-fake-election-news-
outperformed-real-news-on-facebook?utm_term=.yxER8laNQ#.avAbrgen7. 
3
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Mark Zuckerberg testified before the Senate and two 
Congressional Committees after a scandal broke out that 
political consulting firm, Cambridge Analytica, had improperly 
obtained personal information on eighty-seven million Facebook 
users.6  The CEOs of Google and Twitter were also called to 
testify.7  The Facebook hearings were supposed to be about 
Facebook’s data privacy practices, but questions came up on a 
wide range of topics, such as the existence of political bias within 
the company, Facebook’s role in the opioid crisis, whether 
Facebook is responsible for the content on its platform the same 
way publishers are, and whether Facebook is a monopoly.8  
Cambridge Analytica subsequently announced that it was 
shutting down.9 
These incidents represent only the latest wave of issues 
involving online platforms.  In recent years, the platforms’ many 
functions have given rise to disagreements both in academic 
literature and pop culture about what their role is  and what it 
should and should not be.  Are platforms media companies or 
technology companies?  Are they broadcasters or mere 
intermediaries?  Are they editors with First Amendment 
protection, or do they behave like state actors?  Do they operate 
like public utilities?  Are they monopolies?10  The list of questions 
continues, but underlying the growing body of literature is a 
 
6.  See Nicholas Confessore, Cambridge Analytica and Facebook: The 
Scandal and the Fallout So Far, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 4, 2018), https://www.ny 
times.com/2018/04/04/us/politics/cambridge-analytica-scandal-fallout.html. 
7.  Alfred Ng, Senate Summons Facebook, Google, Twitter CEOs over Data 
Privacy, CNET (Mar. 26, 2018, 1:23 PM), https://www.cnet.com/ news/senate-
calls-google-facebook-twitter-ceos-in-for-data-privacy/. 
8.  See Transcript of Mark Zuckerberg’s Senate Hearing, WASH. POST (Apr. 
10, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2018/04 
/10/transcript-of-mark-zuckerbergs-senate-
hearing/?utm_term=.e87c9e091a48; Transcript of Zuckerberg’s Appearance 
Before House Committee, WASH. POST (Apr. 11, 2018), https://www.wash 
ingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2018/04/11/transcript-of-zuckerbergs-
appearance-before-house-committee/?utm_term=.cec873708c75. 
9.  Rebecca Ballhaus & Jenny Gross, Cambridge Analytica Closing 
Operations Following Facebook Data Controversy, WALL ST. J. (May 2, 2018, 
7:20 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/cambridge-analytica-closing-opera 
tions-following-facebook-data-controversy-1525284140. 
10.  For an analysis of the different analogies used, see generally Heather 
Whitney, Search Engines, Social Media, and the Editorial Analogy, KNIGHT 
FIRST AMENDMENT INST. (Feb. 26, 2018), https://knightcolumbia.org 
/content/search-engines-social-media-and-editorial-analogy. 
4https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol39/iss1/3
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common  set of  concerns: should  we regulate the way these 
platforms handle public expression, and, if so, can we do it in a 
way that is aligned with our constitutional values? 
This paper answers both concerns in the affirmative, 
arguing that there is a subset of algorithms social media 
platforms use to filter public expression, which can be regulated 
without constitutional barriers. These are the content 
navigation algorithms,11 which, because of their function, 
deserve separate constitutional treatment.  Unlike algorithms 
that decide what content to censor or allow on the platform, 
which perform a somewhat editorial role and, as such, receive 
constitutional protection, the regulation of content navigation 
algorithms is not preempted by the First Amendment. This 
categorization is elaborated on below, but to make the point less 
abstract, an application is offered: while we cannot address a 
phenomenon like fake news by outlawing its existence or 
requiring platforms to censor it, what we can do is address the 
way fake news gets amplified by regulating the algorithms that 
perform content navigation functions.  Fake news is only one of 
the issues that such regulation can address; it serves as a timely 
example because it is an issue that, perhaps better than any 
other, has highlighted the pathologies of the current digital 
information ecosystem.12 
A first step to unpacking the issues is to clarify what we 
mean when we refer to online platforms.  Social media 
companies were the first to use the term platform in describing 
their services, but the term now extends to companies focused 
on services beyond expressive content, such as retail (Amazon), 
transportation (Uber), and real estate and hospitality 
(AirBnB).13  For the purposes of this paper, the analysis is 
limited to the original use of the term, i.e. to social media 
platforms that handle predominantly expressive content.  
Examples include: Facebook, Instagram, Twitter, and YouTube.  
 
11.  See infra Part II(B) for definition and discussion of content navigation 
algorithms. 
12.  See generally David M. J. Lazer et al., The Science of Fake News, 359 
SCI. 1094 (2018), http://science.sciencemag.org/content/359/6380/1094. 
13.  Tarleton Gillespie, The Platform Metaphor, Revisited, CULTURE 
DIGITALLY (Aug. 24, 2017), http://culturedigitally.org/2017/08/platform-
metaphor/. 
5
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Retail and other platforms operate under different economics 
and should be analyzed separately.  Google, although it has 
somewhat similar economics to social media platforms, is also 
distinguishable in the way it curates public expression. 
Social media platforms are private entities that play two 
distinct roles in the systems of information flow: 1) they host 
public expression online, i.e. they offer storage, and 2) they 
provide “navigation and delivery of the digital content of 
others.”14  They operate as online content intermediaries, whose 
functions are performed by algorithms that are designed by 
humans, with humans sometimes interfering with the results of 
the algorithms. 
Interestingly, commentators have pointed out that the 
choice of the word platform is not accidental, both in the 
companies’ self-characterizations and in the public discourse.  
Rather, the term reveals the position that such intermediaries 
are trying to establish.15  A platform connotes “a ‘raised, level 
surface’ designed to facilitate some activity that will 
subsequently take place.”16  The term is “anticipatory, but not 
causal,” implies an initial neutrality, and suggests a progressive 
and egalitarian arrangement that promises to “support those 
who stand upon it.”17 
As such, the word platform seems to serve social media 
companies quite well.  Social media companies have to appeal to 
different constituencies, namely users, advertisers, content 
producers, and policymakers, in a way that eases the tensions 
between them and implies equality and fairness.18  Using such 
positioning, these private entities have become the primary 
curators of the cultural discussion online,19 but have managed to 
 
14.  Tarleton Gillespie, The Politics of ‘Platforms,’ 12 NEW MEDIA & SOC’Y 
347, 348 (2010); see also EMILY BELL & TAYLOR OWEN, TOW CTR. FOR DIG. 
JOURNALISM, THE PLATFORM PRESS HOW SILICON VALLEY REENGINEERED 
JOURNALISM (2017), http://towcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/The_ 
Platform_Press_Tow_Report_2017.pdf. 
15.  Gillespie, id. at 348. 
16.  Id. at 350. 
17.  Id. 
18.  Id. at 348. 
19.  See Elisa Shearer & Jeffrey Gottfried, News Use Across Social Media 
Platforms 2017, PEW RES. CTR. (Sept. 7, 2017), http://www.journalism 
.org/2017/09/07/news-use-across-social-media-platforms-2017/ (reporting that, 
according to a 2017 survey by the Pew Research Center, 67% of Americans get 
6https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol39/iss1/3
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present themselves as the antidote to traditional mass media 
associated with the notion of “elitist gatekeeper[s].”20  Part I will 
elaborate on these dynamics, but for introductory purposes two 
(perhaps self-evident) observations are made.  Firstly, the 
interests of the different constituencies involved are not aligned 
most of the time.  Secondly, it is the economic interests of the 
platforms themselves as private companies that ultimately drive 
their business models. 
Curating speech or expressive content can come in flavors, 
and there are several problematic issues when it comes to how 
these private entities curate speech.  To make sense of them, this 
Article starts by making an important distinction.  There are two 
different ways in which these private entities curate speech, 
which parallel their separate functions of hosting versus 
providing navigation and delivery of public expression. 
The first way platforms curate or govern online speech is 
through their content moderation policies. The process of 
content moderation determines whether specific content items 
can be hosted and can continue to be hosted on the platform. It 
addresses the question of whether content can exist or survive 
on the platform (ex ante and ex post moderation21), regardless of 
who actually sees or interacts with it.  This process involves 
monitoring for illegal, offensive, and inappropriate content, or 
content that is simply not consistent with the culture of the 
users, and subsequently deciding whether to censor such 
content.22 Content moderation policies consist of detailed sets of 
rules, which are constantly updated and largely opaque.  Their 
opaqueness has been long criticized by scholars23 and has 
occasionally been the cause of public outcry in instances where 
 
news from social media). 
20.  Gillespie, supra note 14, at 352. 
21.  See id. at 1636–38. 
22.  See Kate Klonick, Comment, The New Governors: The People, Rules, 
and Processes Governing Online Speech, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1598 (2018) 
(arguing that “these platforms are best thought of as self-regulating private 
entities, governing speech within the coverage of the First Amendment by 
reflecting the democratic culture and norms of their users” (footnotes omitted)). 
23.  See generally Danielle Keats Citron & Benjamin Wittes, The Internet 
Will Not Break: Denying Bad Samaritans § 230 Immunity, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 
401 (2017); Rebecca Tushnet, Power Without Responsibility: Intermediaries 
and the First Amendment, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 986 (2008). 
7
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content is perceived as unjustly or wrongfully removed.24  While 
concerns relating to content censorship decisions are very 
legitimate and thoroughly discussed by academics, they are not 
the focus of this paper. 
The second way in which these platforms govern speech is 
by providing navigation through the infinitely growing quantity 
of available content.  In this case, the curation process is not 
about allowing or disallowing content, but rather curation is 
about deciding to which specific content items to point the users’ 
attention.  It is this latter type of speech curation that is 
addressed in this paper.25  Such curation is addressed both to 
users as individuals through personalization algorithms, and to 
all platform users as a whole, through algorithms that select 
content that is trending or popular.  In both of these forms, 
content navigation algorithms are, to an increasing degree, 
shaping our participation in public life.26  As Tarleton Gillespie 
has observed, “[t]ogether, these algorithms not only help us find 
information, they also provide a means to know what there is to 
know and how to know it, to participate in social and political 
discourse, and to familiarize ourselves with the publics in which 
we participate.”27 
The concerns in this type of speech curation are not about 
censorship per se.  Algorithmic measures of popularity or what 
is trending make an explicit claim of a “calculated public[]” and 
become cultural objects of meaning, in which individuals can 
look for “a reflection of the public in which they take part.”28  
 
24.  See Zoe Kleinman, Fury over Facebook ‘Napalm Girl’ Censorship, 
BBC NEWS (Sept. 9, 2016), http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-37318031. 
25.  The two categories may seem to overlap sometimes, such as when a 
trending algorithm selects content that is considered illegal or inappropriate, 
but the questions of why the specific content was allowed to exist on the 
platform and why it surfaced as popular or trending are still fundamentally 
different questions. 
26.  Tarleton Gillespie, The Relevance of Algorithms, in MEDIA TECHS.: 
ESSAYS ON COMMC’N, MATERIALITY, & SOC’Y 167, 167 (Tarleton Gillespie et al. 
eds., MIT Press 2014). 
27.  Id. 
28.  Tarleton Gillespie, #TrendingisTrending: When Algorithms Become 
Culture, in ALGORITHMIC CULTURES: ESSAYS ON MEANING, PERFORMANCE & NEW 
TECHS. 52, 67, 69 (Robert Seyfert & Jonathan Roberge eds., 2016) (explaining 
that “calculated publics. . .imply a body of people who have been measured and 
assessed, as an explanation for why particular information has been presented 
as relevant to them” and that “trending algorithms make the claim of this 
8https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol39/iss1/3
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However, the ways in which this public is measured and shaped 
depart significantly from traditional assumptions on the role of 
news media in society and the democratizing promise of the 
Internet.  This raises growing concerns about the failure of 
media literacy and lack of data literacy.29  Personalization 
further adds to the concerns, as the fracturing of individual 
experiences, has been criticized for producing filter bubbles and 
echo chambers.30  Users are only directed to content that is in 
agreement with their existing viewpoints, which in turn leads to 
ideological isolation, polarization in society, and increased 
vulnerability to believing in falsehoods—or so the argument 
goes.31 
The distinction between the two types of speech curation 
just described—curating for hosting purposes versus curating 
for navigation purposes—matters especially when assessing the 
viability of legal regulation, and can help categorize the growing 
body of literature.  Doctrinal barriers32 make it extremely 
challenging to regulate how platform content moderation 
policies work, meaning how platforms make decisions about 
what content items to host.  On the other hand, this paper will 
argue, the challenges are not as strong when it comes to how 
platforms facilitate content navigation.  The assertion is that we 
should regulate content navigation algorithms to an extent, that 
 
calculated public more explicit: this is what ‘we’ are reading, this is what my 
city or country is tweeting about, this is what America is listening to today.”). 
29.  See Monica Bulger & Patrick Davison, The Promises, Challenges, and 
Futures of Media Literacy DATA & SOC’Y RESEARCH INST. 15–17 (2018), 
https://datasociety.net/pubs/oh/DataAndSociety_Media_Literacy_2018.pdf. 
30.  See generally ELI PARISER, THE FILTER BUBBLE: WHAT THE INTERNET 
IS HIDING FROM YOU (Penguin Books Ltd. 2011); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, #REPUBLIC: 
DIVIDED DEMOCRACY IN THE AGE OF SOCIAL MEDIA (Princeton Univ. Press 2017). 
31.  See Michela Del Vicario et al., The Spreading of Misinformation 
Online, 113 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCIS. U.S. AM. 554, 558 (2016), 
http://www.pnas.org/content/pnas/113/3/554.full.pdf (stating “[u]sers tend to 
aggregate in communities of interest, which causes reinforcement and fosters 
confirmation bias, segregation, and polarization. This comes at the expense of 
the quality of the information and leads to proliferation of biased narratives 
fomented by unsubstantiated rumors, mistrust, and paranoia”); but see Yochai 
Benkler et al., Study: Breitbart-Led Right-Wing Media Ecosystem Altered 
Broader Media Agenda, COLUMBIA JOURNALISM REVIEW (Mar. 3, 2017), 
https://www.cjr.org/analysis/breitbart-media-trump-harvard-study.php 
(suggesting that polarization is asymmetric). 
32.  Namely, the First Amendment combined with Section 230 of the 
Communications Decency Act. 
9
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we can do so without doctrinal barriers, and that doing so can 
address some of the challenges present in the content 
moderation context. 
The paper proceeds in the following manner: Part I 
addresses the question of why regulate at all and explains what 
makes online platforms deserving of independent analysis.  Part 
II addresses doctrinal barriers to regulation and argues that 
these do not apply in the content navigation context.  Part III 
touches on an additional way to regulate the content navigation 
architecture and provides a brief supplementary discussion on 
the failure of self-regulation.  Part IV concludes. 
 
I. Why Regulate? 
 
This part of the paper illustrates what is different in today’s 
information ecosystem, why online platforms deserve 
independent analysis and why we should regulate at all. 
 
A. Is There Anything Different Here? 
 
Before embarking on the analysis of platforms, it is worth 
taking a brief pause and looking at a bigger picture.  Back in 
1996, at a conference on the Law of Cyberspace, Judge Frank 
Easterbrook flatly told the assembled crowd that no one in the 
room was going to win a Nobel Prize and that they were all at 
risk of multidisciplinary dilettantism.33  For Judge Easterbrook, 
the Law of Cyberspace was as useless as the Law of the Horse.34  
His reasoning was that “the best way to learn the law applicable 
to specialized endeavors is to study the general rules.”35  Cases 
on people kicked by horses are better understood through the 
law of torts, not by reading 100% of the cases on this very specific 
issue. 
Similarly, one could argue that, in some ways, there is 
nothing special about online platforms.  We have the general 
rules on issues such as defamation, discrimination, competition, 
 
33.  Frank H. Easterbrook, Cyberspace and the Law of the Horse, 1996 U. 
CHI. LEGAL F. 207, 207 (1996). 
34.  See id. 
35.  Id. 
10https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol39/iss1/3
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free speech, intermediary liability, and so forth.  This will not be 
the first time the law has to adapt to a new technology, nor is it 
the first time that companies driven by advertising profits select 
the headlines.  Media companies have been doing this for 
years.36  However, there is something very special about 
cyberspace and there is value in looking at these platforms 
separately.  Presented below are two responses advanced by 
scholars that illustrate why in the context of cyberspace the 
issues deserve independent study. 
Writing in 2004, Jack Balkin cautioned that “[i]n studying 
the Internet, to ask ‘What is genuinely new here?’ is to ask the 
wrong question.”37  For Balkin, focusing on novelty is the wrong 
way to think about technological change and public policy.38  We 
will always find an analogue in the past, and then conclude that 
because there is nothing utterly new, nothing important has 
changed.39  Instead, what we should be focusing on is salience.  
In Balkin’s view, the right questions to ask are: which elements 
of the social world and what features of human activity or the 
human condition are emphasized and brought to the foreground 
by the new technology?40  More importantly, what are the 
consequences of this new emphasis for human freedom?41  In 
other words, even if there is nothing utterly novel, and the 
change is not a change in kind but simply one of degree, it can 
still have important consequences for society. 
From a different point of view, Lawrence Lessig saw a 
structural change taking place in cyberspace, one that can teach 
very important general principles.42  Lessig points out that law 
 
36.  See infra note 56 and accompanying text. 
37.  Jack M. Balkin, Digital Speech and Democratic Culture: A Theory of 
Freedom of Expression for the Information Society, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 2 
(2004). 
38.  Id. at 2–3. 
39.  Id. 
40.  Id. 
41.  Id. 
42.  A few years post-Judge Easterbrook’s intervention, Lawrence Lessig, 
who could not put the issue behind, wrote a commentary in the Harvard Law 
Review, as well as a more complete book, in an effort to illustrate that the Law 
of Cyberspace can, in fact, teach some very important general principles.  See 
generally Lawrence Lessig, The Law of the Horse: What Cyberlaw Might Teach, 
113 HARV. L. REV. 501 (1999); see also LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER 
LAWS OF CYBERSPACE (Basic Books 1999).  
11
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is just one of the ways that human behavior can be regulated; 
there are three additional modalities of regulation, namely 
social norms, markets, and architecture.43  These modalities 
regulate together, and any policy’s ultimate effect should be seen 
as the sum of the regulatory effects of all four modalities 
together. Why does this matter for our purposes?  The answer is 
that, in the digital environment (i.e. cyberspace), the fourth 
modality is quite different than it is in real space. 
By architecture, Lessig refers to the physical world—both 
“as we find it” and “how it has already been made.”44  He gives 
the example of the city of Paris, where large boulevards limit the 
ability of revolutionaries to protest;—a constraint on behavior 
that has nothing to do with legal regulation.  Similarly, Long 
Island bridges were built low, blocking public buses from passing 
under.  The result was that people depending on public transport 
could not get to the beaches in Long Island, but the constraint 
was one imposed by architecture. 
The non-plasticity of real space means there is very little we 
can do to change the architecture once it is there, or that doing 
so is disproportionately costly.  In cyberspace however, 
architecture is a function of code; it is the code that defines the 
conditions of access and the limits of functionality, and code is 
not static.  Programmers can change the code in an instant.  The 
government can also regulate the code by demanding that 
programmers change it; we cannot say the same about 
rebuilding bridges.  This implies two things for any possible 
regulatory scheme: first, changes in the code can change the net 
effect of any policy, and second, it is much easier in cyberspace 
than it is in real space to direct policies to the architecture. 
If we apply Lessig’s framework to online speech, we 
conclude that in the digital ecosystem, the conditions of access 
to speech and to speakers are both easy and quick to change.  
This is because it is code that provides the architecture through 
which speech is regulated online.  Programmers can change the 
access parameters—the code—at their initiative, or because 
legal regulation requires them to do so.  Any legal intervention  
 
43.  The Law of the Horse, supra note 42, at 507; see also CODE AND OTHER 
LAWS, supra note 42, at 30–42. 
44.  The Law of the Horse, supra note 42, at 507. 
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can be directed to this architecture, to the content (speech), or 
to both. 
Let us look at the fake news example in order to 
contextualize the prior discussion: a problem like fake news is 
very challenging for regulators.  For starters, many would argue 
that fake news has always existed; it is a very old problem and 
there is nothing novel about it that requires the attention of the 
regulators.45  Further, any attempt to regulate fake news can be 
perceived as worse than the problem itself.46  Let us imagine a 
regulation making fake news illegal and requiring platforms to 
remove it; in fact, the Malaysian government recently passed 
such a law.47  In the U.S., it is extremely unlikely that it could 
pass First Amendment scrutiny—and for good reason.  From a 
policy perspective, we do not want the government deciding 
what counts as fake, nor do we want to punish people for being 
wrong on the Internet, as both can have a chilling effect on 
speech in general.  What regulators can do, however, is address 
the way fake news is spread and amplified through the 
platforms’ architecture.  This type of regulation is addressed to 
the content navigation algorithms and it is not subject to the 
same doctrinal and normative limitations.  It does not target the 
existence of fake news, but rather the ways in which an old 
problem has become more salient due to the unique features of 
the digital ecosystem that control speech online.48 
 
45.  See Eugene Volokh, Fake News and the Law, from 1798 to Now, 
WASH. POST: VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Dec. 9, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost 
.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2016/12/09/fake-news-and-the-law-from-
1798-to-now/?utm_term=.660884b067ba. 
46.  Anthony L. Fisher, Fake News Is Bad. Attempts to Ban It Are Worse, 
VOX (July 5, 2017), https://www.vox.com/the-big-idea/2017/7/5/15906382/fake-
news-free-speech-facebook-google. 
47.  Hannah Beech, As Malaysia Moves to Ban ‘Fake News,’ Worries About 
Who Decides the Truth, N.Y. TIMES, April 3, 2018, at A5; Sandeep Gopalan, 
Free Speech Cannot Be Sacrificed to Strike Fake News, THE HILL (Apr. 6, 2018, 
11:00 AM), http://thehill.com/opinion/cybersecurity/381871-free-speech-
cannot-be-sacrificed-to-strike-fake-news; Yantoultra Ngui, Malaysia Passes 
‘Fake News’ Law that Critics Call an Assault on Speech, WALL ST. J. (April 3, 
2018, 8:07 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/malaysia-passes-fake-news-law-
that-critics-call-an-assault-on-speech-1522757225. 
48.  Nabiha Syed, Real Talk About Fake News: Towards a Better Theory 
for Platform Governance, 127 YALE L.J. F. 337 (2017), http://www.yalelaw 
journal.org/forum/real-talk-about-fake-news. 
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The fake news example will be used throughout the paper 
as a thread to demonstrate the asserted arguments.  The next 
section explores the conditions of speech in the digital 
ecosystem, highlighting why there is a need for regulation under 
these new conditions. 
 
B. The New Environment 
 
Up until quite recently, the main barrier to speech entering 
the marketplace of ideas was thought of as the (in)ability to 
publish and access the distribution channels.  Content was 
scarce, and the focus of regulatory schemes was to ensure that it 
was not suppressed.  For instance, the fairness doctrine, which 
required broadcasters to present both sides of issues of public 
importance, was valid at a time when broadcast spectrum was 
scarce.  The Court saw the doctrine as promoting First 
Amendment values49 such as an unfettered marketplace of 
ideas. 
Today, we live in a very different information environment.  
Technology has made it extremely cheap, quick, and easy, for 
just about anyone to create content and make it available online.  
Platforms, acting as online intermediaries, provide speakers 
with access to a large audience, having little incentive 
themselves to monitor the content that is distributed through 
them.50  Information has become abundant; in fact, we are 
drowning in it, and what is now becoming scarce is that which 
information consumes, i.e. the attention of the listeners.51 The 
term attention economy52 has almost made its way into pop 
 
49.  Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969). 
50.  See infra Part II(A) (discussing Section 230 of the Communications 
Decency Act). 
51.  See Herbert A. Simon, Designing Organizations for an Information-
Rich World, in COMPUTERS, COMMUNICATIONS, AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 37, 
40–41 (Martin Greenberger ed., Johns Hopkins Press 1971) (stating “in an 
information-rich world, the wealth of information means a dearth of something 
else: a scarcity of whatever it is that information consumes. What information 
consumes is rather obvious: it consumes the attention of its recipients. Hence 
a wealth of information creates a poverty of attention and a need to allocate 
that attention efficiently among the overabundance of information sources that 
might consume it”). 
52.  See TIM WU, THE ATTENTION MERCHANTS: THE EPIC SCRAMBLE TO GET 
INSIDE OUR HEADS 6 (Knopf 2016). 
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culture, with more and more news articles referring to the 
concept.53 
In this information-rich environment, platforms have taken 
on the role of the curators, using their algorithms to distribute 
and deliver content—speech—to their audience.  We the 
listeners need someone—the algorithms—to curate for us and 
tell us where to look; it is simply impossible to go through 
everything that is out there on our own.  The platforms on the 
other hand, want to keep our attention because they want to 
keep us on the platform.  The more time users spend on the 
platform, the more appealing that platform becomes to 
advertisers, who are then willing to spend more money to 
capture the attention of these users.  For the most part, the 
revenue of the platforms comes from advertising, so they need to 
establish a reputation of keeping their audience happy and 
engaged; this makes users return to the platform and 
advertisers willing to pay money for those users. 
The tricky part is that the platforms’ goal is not necessarily 
welfare enhancing.  They just need to keep users on the 
platform.  In fact, sometimes lower quality or easier-to-consume-
content can serve this goal better.54  The exact criteria each 
platform chooses are mostly opaque, but what is becoming clear 
is that these private companies have developed intricate 
 
53.  Charles M. Blow, Opinion, Trump’s Attention Economy, N.Y. TIMES 
(Jan. 4, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/04/opinion/trump-attention-
economy.html; Mathew Ingram, The Attention Economy and the Implosion of 
Traditional Media, FORTUNE (Aug. 12, 2015), http://fortune.com/2015/08/12/ 
attention-economy/; Andrew Keen, The ‘Attention Economy’ Created by Silicon 
Valley Is Bankrupting Us, TECHCRUNCH (July 30, 2017), 
https://techcrunch.com/2017/07/30/the-attention-economy-created-by-silicon-
valley-is-bankrupting-us/; Robert Safian, How to Stand Out in the Attention 
Economy, FAST COMPANY (Oct. 3, 2017), https://www.fastcompany.com 
/40473876/how-to-stand-out-in-the-attention-economy. 
54.  See PARISER, supra note 30, at 68 (describing the theory of “least 
objectionable programming” as it originates from researching TV viewers’ 
behavior in the 1970s, where it was noticed that with the increasing number 
of available channels, people quit channel surfing far more quickly than one 
might suspect.  During most of those thirty-six hours a week (that Americans 
watch TV), the theory suggests, they are not looking for a program in 
particular, but rather they are just looking to be “unobjectionably 
entertained.”); see also SUNSTEIN, supra note 30, at 65 (describing information 
cocoons and group polarization). 
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systems for moderating and curating speech.55  As highlighted 
in the introduction, there is a conceptual distinction between 
speech curation for hosting purposes versus speech curation for 
content navigation purposes.  The former involves deciding 
whether content is allowed to exist on the platform, while the 
latter involves deciding which items to draw the users’ attention 
to. 
When it comes to the latter, one could argue that majority 
tastes and popularity of content have always played a role in 
content selection and placement.56  Traditional media has 
always used these factors in decision-making, especially when 
choosing headlines, but audience feedback was never as accurate 
and instantaneous.  Big Data technologies now allow for precise 
tracking and analysis at the moment of content consumption.  
They also allow for instantaneous adjustment of the content 
selection based on the feedback.  Traditional editors never had 
that kind of power.57  Algorithmic navigation represents a new 
kind of knowledge logic, to be contrasted with the editorial 
logic.58  That it not to say that one is better than the other in 
 
55.  Klonick, supra note 22, at 1660. 
56.  See Robert C. Post, Data Privacy and Dignitary Privacy: Google 
Spain, the Right to Be Forgotten, and the Construction of the Public Sphere, 67 
DUKE L.J. 981, 1021, 1023 (2018) (noting that, with the rise of the 
contemporary American newspaper, “[n]ewspapers began to compete in the 
‘commodity’ of ‘news, i.e. information respecting recent events in which the 
public takes an interest, or in which an interest can be excited’” and “expanded 
their circulation by reshaping the commodity of news to meet the interests of 
the masses. Newspapermen justified their expansion by claiming to supply 
‘what the public wanted—witness their growing sales’”) (citations omitted). 
57.   A/B testing and its application to news headlines is an illustration of 
how extreme this editing can get. See A/B Testing, OPTIMIZELY, 
https://www.optimizely.com/ab-testing (illustrating how extreme this editing 
can get through A/B testing and its application to news headlines); see also 
C.W. ANDERSON ET AL., THE NEWS MEDIA: WHAT EVERYONE NEEDS TO KNOW 65 
(Oxford Univ. Press 2016) (stating “[b]oth new and old news media also are 
using digital technology to closely monitor the size and news habits of their 
audiences, including audiences for individual stories, images, and features on 
their websites. Some news organizations are using these audience metrics to 
evaluate the productivity of their journalists and the popularity of their stories, 
even basing compensation on that data. Some also are using digital traffic data 
to decide what news to cover, rather than relying only on journalists’ news 
judgment”). 
58.  See Gillespie, supra note 26, at 192 (noting that “the editorial logic 
depends on the subjective choices of experts, who are themselves made and 
authorized through institutional processes of training and certification, or 
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deciding what information to draw the public’s attention to; the 
point is that they are different. 
With significant traffic on news sites coming from social 
media platforms, editorial decisions of traditional news outlets 
may now include calculations addressing the ways in which 
specific platforms filter content.  Reporters feel additional 
pressure to write click-bait articles that “pander to readers’ 
worst impulses,” as the stories that actually gain traction online 
are the “[t]oo-good-to-check” stories rather than the ones that 
are comprehensively reported.59  In fact, studies show that 59% 
of the links shared on Twitter have not been read at all by the 
people who share them.60  The majority of users simply sees and 
shares headlines without ever looking at the content of the 
articles below them.  These headlines then get amplified, 
because in the eyes of content navigation algorithms, the 
number of shares an article gets is more indicative of what is 
important and popular than the percentage of users that 
actually read the article.61 
In the context of this new algorithmic knowledge logic, 
traditional news outlets face an uncertain future.  They still 
have to bear the costs of producing content that adheres to 
journalistic standards, but as their audience has moved to the 
social web, they have lost control of the distribution channels 
and the advertising revenues that follow these channels.  The 
platforms are now the biggest distributors of news and, at the 
same time, they control the public discourse.  If we had to draw 
an (imperfect) analogy, the platforms are both the newsstand 
 
validated by the public through the mechanisms of the market. The 
algorithmic logic, by contrast, depends on the proceduralized choices of a 
machine, designed by human operators to automate some proxy of human 
judgment or unearth patterns across collected social traces.”)  
59.  Timothy B. Lee, Mark Zuckerberg Is in Denial About How Facebook 
Is Harming Our Politics, VOX (Nov. 10, 2016, 10:25 PM), http://www.vox.com 
/new-money/2016/11/6/13509854/facebook-politics-news-bad. 
60.  MAKSYM GABIELKOV ET AL., SOCIAL CLICKS: WHAT AND WHO GETS READ 
ON TWITTER? (2016), https://hal.inria.fr/hal-01281190/document; see also 
Caitlin Dewey, 6 in 10 of You Will Share This Link Without Reading It, a New, 
Depressing Study Says, WASH. POST (June 16, 2016), https://www 
.washingtonpost.com/news/the-intersect/wp/2016/06/16/six-in-10-of-you-will-
share-this-link-without-reading-it-according-to-a-new-and-depressing-
study/?utm_term=.0c9e20635aeb. 
61.  Id. 
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and the town square, and the content available on the 
newsstand is constantly updated based on the town square 
discussion.  Put differently, what used to be just “ephemeral 
words” in a traditional town square, is now “indexed data” 
accessible to a remarkable degree of granularity.62  Additionally, 
every person sees a different newsstand because content 
navigation algorithms personalize our news feeds.  So the town 
square is looking less like an agora and more like a Tower of 
Babel. 
To put these concerns into perspective, in 2017 two-thirds 
(67%) of U.S. adults were found to get news on social media (the 
leader of which is Facebook).63  The increase in news 
consumption on social media is especially notable for different 
demographics than previously: in 2017, 55% of Americans ages 
fifty or older reported getting news on social media sites versus 
45% who reported so in 2016.64  As audiences move to the mobile 
and social web, news organizations follow.  For instance, CNN, 
outside its core digital outlets CNN Desktop, CNN Go, CNN 
mobile web, and CNN apps, uses five different video platforms, 
twelve different social and messaging platforms, and eleven 
emerging and off-platforms.65 
 
C. The Dangers 
 
Let us now revisit the fake news example; the phenomenon 
has attracted global concern.  A first-of-its-kind new study by 
MIT scientists based on Twitter data found that falsehoods 
“diffused significantly farther, faster, deeper, and more broadly 
than the truth in all categories of information, and the effects 
were more pronounced for false political news.”66  A group of 
 
62.  Syed, supra note 48, at 345. 
63.  See Shearer & Gottfried, supra note 19, at 2. 
64.  Id. 
65.  BELL & OWEN, supra note 14, at 27 fig.2. 
66.  Soroush Vosoughi et al., The Spread of True and False News Online, 
359 SCI. 1146 (2018), http://science.sciencemag.org/content/359/6380/1146 
(finding that false news was more novel than true news, which suggests that 
people were more likely to share novel information); see also Robinson Meyer, 
The Grim Conclusions of the Largest-Ever Study of Fake News, ATLANTIC (Mar. 
8, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2018/03/ largest-
study-ever-fake-news-mit-twitter/555104/. 
18https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol39/iss1/3
ARTICLE 3_GRAFANAKI.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 3/28/2019  1:46 PM 
2018 REGULATING THE FILTERS 129 
renowned social scientists are calling for interdisciplinary 
research to “reduce the spread of fake news and to address the 
underlying pathologies it has revealed.”67  The reason we are 
collectively alarmed by the phenomenon is not because it is 
novel, but because long-standing safeguards against 
misinformation have eroded.68  What was previously sitting in 
the fringes has now inundated public discourse.69  The agony is 
not over the existence of fake news, but rather over the fact that 
it can now “spread[] so quickly and persuade[] so effectively.”70  
These pathologies of the digital information system are all a 
function of its architecture.  At the center of this architecture are 
the filtering algorithms that provide content navigation. 
In a non-platform world, fake news would get quashed at 
some point.  This is not because anyone would censor it; every 
citizen of a democracy has an equal right to participate in the 
public discourse, regardless of whether what he or she has to say 
is untrue or wrong.  Fake news would be quashed in the sense of 
being irrelevant because in a functioning marketplace of ideas, 
dialogue would eventually lead to a prevailing truth.  From a 
Meiklejohnian perspective, dialogue would ensure that citizens 
vote in a fully informed and intelligent way, at least in theory.71  
However, in today’s platform-dominated world, dialogue often 
takes the form of a continuous reinforcement of existing beliefs 
within polarized silos of personalization. Now that is a big claim, 
but the explanation which follows will unpack it.72 
Filter bubbles and echo chambers were briefly mentioned in 
the introduction, but it is worth revisiting the concepts in light 
of all this background.73  In a world of abundant content and 
 
67.  Lazer et al., supra note 12, at 4. 
68.  Id. 
69.  See generally Syed, supra note 48. 
70.  Id. at 337. 
71.  See Robert Post, Reconciling Theory and Doctrine in First Amendment 
Jurisprudence, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 2353, 2367 (2000) (explaining the 
Meiklejohnian approach as one that understands the First Amendment “to 
protect the communicative processes necessary to disseminate the information 
and ideas required for citizens to vote in a fully informed and intelligent way” 
and views democracy as a process of “the voting of wise decisions.” (footnote 
omitted)). 
72.  See also infra notes 149–178 and accompanying text. 
73.  See Sofia Grafanaki, Autonomy Challenges in the Age of Big Data, 27 
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 803, 825 (2017) (discussing 
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attention scarcity, platforms have to figure out how to best direct 
users to content.  Their economic incentives dictate a need to 
keep users on the platform as long as possible.  To accomplish 
this, they try to serve their users with content that is relevant 
to them and market this effort as serving the interests of their 
users.  Relevance is measured through complex and opaque 
calculations involving data on the individual users and users like 
them.  Clicks and shares indicate engagement and take priority 
over the quality of information.74 
Research has repeatedly illustrated that when confronted 
with diverse information choices, people tend to choose what 
feels comfortable and confirms their existing opinion and 
biases.75  Individuals are also more likely to believe narratives 
they have heard before and information that comes from 
familiar sources, such as friends sharing a link.76  When 
consuming information, they also settle for the least 
objectionable option77 instead of seeking out the best choice, as 
the effort alone leads to cognitive overload.78  Putting everything 
together, we end up in an environment where users are only 
directed to content that is familiar to them and in agreement 
with their existing viewpoints—a filter bubble.79  On top of that, 
 
algorithmic self-reinforcing loops). 
74.  See Matt McGee, EdgeRank Is Dead: Facebook’s News Feed Algorithm 
Now Has Close to 100K Weight Factors, MARKETING LAND (Aug. 16, 2013, 9:00 
AM), https://marketingland.com/edgerank-is-dead-facebooks-news-feed-
algorithm-now-has-close-to-100k-weight-factors-55908; see also Facebook 
NewsFeed Algorithm History, WALLAROO MEDIA https://wallaroomedia.com 
/facebook-newsfeed-algorithm-change-history/ (last updated Nov. 20, 2018). 
75.  See SUNSTEIN, supra note 30, at ch. 4; see also Farhad Manjoo, Our 
Grip on the Truth, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 2, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/ 
11/03/technology/how-the-internet-is-loosening-our-grip-on-the-
truth.html?_r=0. 
76.  See Syed, supra note 48, at 350 n.45 (referencing the “illusory truth 
effect” where “familiarity increases the ease with which statements are 
processed (i.e., processing fluency), which in turn is used heuristically to infer 
accuracy”). 
77.  PARISER, supra note 30.  
78.  See Margarita Tartakovsky, Overcoming Information Overload, 
PSYCHCENTRAL,  
https://psychcentral.com/blog/overcoming-information-overload (last updated 
Jul. 8, 2018) (describing cognitive overload as a phenomenon where our brains 
get overwhelmed by too much information and too many choices, and 
effectively freeze, leading to indecisiveness, bad decisions, and stress). 
79.  See generally PARISER, supra note 30 (entering the term filter bubble 
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they end up in like-minded communities that transcend previous 
geographical barriers.80  When like-minded groups engage in 
deliberation, they do so in the confines of their eco-chambers.  
The result is a strengthening of the original position and a move 
towards a more extreme point,81 amplified by the fact that 
platforms are designed for fast and frictionless sharing.82  This 
kind of deliberation is very different than the one that promotes 
a democratic culture.  There is no exchange of ideas in the 
marketplace that eventually leads to the truth, or any dialogue 
in a Meiklejohnian town meeting where decision-making is 
collective process.83  On the contrary, mutual understanding 
between groups becomes harder, leading to group polarization.84 
This is why the Tower of Babel metaphor was previously 
used.  Facebook’s new mission statement stresses an effort to 
“give people the power to build community. . . strengthen our 
social fabric and bring the world closer together.”85  So far 
however, these communities that aspire to be the new town 
squares seem to be doing the opposite; they resemble a world 
where everyone speaks a different language and they provide 
fertile ground for falsehoods to spread. 
The version of “addictive and toxic misinformation” the 
world just experienced with the recent fake news epidemic may 
be just the beginning.86  Technological tools that can be used to 
manipulate perception and falsify reality are evolving at a fast 
pace.  The so-called deepfakes, i.e. video content that has been 
manipulated using artificial intelligence, may make the current 
era of fake news seem antiquated.87  Skeptics warn of a future 
 
to the modern lexicon). 
80.  Syed, supra note 48, at 347. 
81.  See SUNSTEIN, supra note 30, at ch. 3 (discussing polarization). 
82.  Syed, supra note 48, at 350. 
83.  See Post, supra note 71, at 2367. 
84.  See Del Vicario et al., supra note 31. 
85.  Josh Constine, Facebook Changes Mission Statement to ‘Bring the 
World Closer Together,’ TECHCRUNCH (June 22, 2017), https://techcrunch.com 
/2017/06/22/bring-the-world-closer-together/ (internal quotations omitted). 
86.  Charlie Warzel, He Predicted the 2016 Fake News Crisis. Now He’s 
Worried About an Information Apocalypse, BUZZFEED NEWS (Feb. 11, 2018, 
8:45 PM), https://www.buzzfeed.com/charliewarzel/the-terrifying-future-of-
fake-news?utm_term=.ubzAJl7dY#.plGNq5EMk. 
87.  Franklin Foer, The Era of Fake Video Begins, ATLANTIC (May 15, 
2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2018/05/realitys-
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where our eyes routinely deceive us and anyone could make it 
appear as if anything has happened, regardless of whether it 
did.88  When technology gets there, its existence alone can start 
impugning content that is real.  If anything can be faked, then 
we reach a point where believing falsehoods and not believing 
truths are one and the same.89  Imagine for example being able 
to make it appear as if a world leader made a statement, which 
they did not in fact make. When only few individuals have the 
time or skill to sort truth from fabrication, people give up and 
stop attempting to figure out what is true and what is fake.  The 
result is a type of reality apathy that usually only appears in 
parts of the world where information is poor and assumed to be 
incorrect.90  Hopefully this scenario is just a dystopian 
nightmare, but one thing we can learn from the recent fake news 
crisis is that the future comes faster than ever before. 
What is true today is the following: our current information 
environment, as produced by social media content navigating 
algorithms, has changed the conditions of speech and is not 
aligned with the prerequisites for citizens in a democratic society 
to perform their civic duties.  Today’s information environment 
undermines the notion of individual autonomy in the selection 
and consumption of content91 and threatens the viability of a 
functioning marketplace of ideas. 
First Amendment jurisprudence has been largely shaped by 
a different information era, namely a time where the audience 
had plenty of time to hear the speakers and the main threat to 
the marketplace of ideas was from government censorship of 
speakers.92  Today’s information environment has very different 
dynamics than the environment the First Amendment can 
 
end/556877/?utm_source=atlfb. 
88.  Id. 
89.  Aviv Ovadya, What’s Worse Than Fake News? The Distortion of 
Reality Itself, WASH. POST (Feb. 22, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
news/theworldpost/wp/2018/02/22/digital-reality/?utm_term=.b0eaea1c7f81. 
90.  Warzel, supra note 86. 
91.  See Grafanaki, supra note 73; see also Sofia Grafanaki, Drowning in 
Big Data: Abundance of Choice, Scarcity of Attention and the Personalization 
Trap, A Case for Regulation, 24 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 1, 26–36 (2017). 
92.  Tim Wu, Is the First Amendment Obsolete?,  
KNIGHT FIRST AMENDMENT INST. 19 (Sept. 2017), https://knightcolumbia.org/ 
content/tim-wu-first-amendment-obsolete. 
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protect, yet the doctrinal focus on protecting the speaker 
remains, which makes it hard to find effective solutions to 
problems like trolling and fake news.93  We may all agree that 
fake news is undesirable, but we do not want the government 
determining what counts as fake.  That is exactly what the First 
Amendment is supposed to safeguard us from; any regulation 
trying to address such an issue would be both a content-based 
and viewpoint-based regulation subject to the strict scrutiny 
standard, which is very hard to satisfy. 
Paradoxically, however, the same doctrine that is meant to 
safeguard a functioning marketplace of ideas is almost making 
it harder to do that in today’s environment.  This is because, as 
several scholars have recently pointed out, today’s tactics for 
suppressing speech are very different than the ones the First 
Amendment was envisioned to address.94  More speech and cheap 
speech are the new ways of speech control, used to flood out and 
drown other speakers, thus undermining them indirectly.95  
Troll armies and bots are often used in this process as well.96 
Scholars go as far as to question whether the First 
Amendment is, in fact, obsolete in such an environment97 and 
argue that the First Amendment can itself be the barrier to 
protecting its underlying values.98  This is because today’s 
speakers face threats, not just from the government, but also 
from the content curation systems they are filtered through.  Yet 
 
93.  See generally Alice Marwick & Rebecca Lewis, Media Manipulation 
and Disinformation Online, DATA & SOC’Y (May 15, 2017), 
https://datasociety.net/pubs/oh/DataAndSociety_MediaManipulationAndDisin
formationOnline.pdf (describing the dynamics of media manipulation and 
disinformation online). 
94.  ZEYNEP TUFEKCI, TWITTER AND TEAR GAS: THE POWER AND FRAGILITY 
OF NETWORKED PROTEST 226 (Yale Univ. Press 2017). 
95.  See Wu, supra note 92, at 3; see generally Richard L. Hasen, Cheap 
Speech and What It Has Done (to American Democracy), 16 FIRST AMEND. L. 
REV. 200 (2017). 
96.  Individuals have also used more speech as a tool for reputation 
management purposes, for instance creating multiple content entries about 
themselves that link to each other in order to push down Google Search results 
that they are trying to erase.  See generally REPUTATION.COM, 
https://reputation.com (last visited Jan. 29, 2019). 
97.  See generally Wu, supra note 92. 
98.  Jack M. Balkin, Free Speech in the Algorithmic Society: Big Data, 
Private Governance, and New School Speech Regulation, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 
1149, 1153–54 (2018). 
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the platforms designing these algorithmic architectures are not 
subject to the First Amendment as private entities, but rather 
use the First Amendment as a shield against attempts to 
regulate their code.  One could again say that we have heard this 
all before,99 but we have also seen the Court uphold regulations 
as constitutional when legally created markets had harmful 
consequences for free speech.100  In those cases, the autonomy of 
the speakers was seen as secondary to the commitment to 
democratic self-government.101 
It is for these reasons that the introduction of regulation 
targeting the underlying architecture is desirable.  Within this 
architecture, if regulation is addressed to the content navigation 
algorithms as opposed to content moderation policies, it can be 
aligned with constitutional values.  The next part of this Article 
starts by setting out the normative and doctrinal barriers that 
make it hard to regulate content moderation algorithms or 
impose liability for content that survives through them.  It then 
proceeds to show that these barriers do not apply in the context 
of content navigation. 
 
 
 
 
99.  See Cass R. Sunstein, Free Speech Now, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 255, 276–
77 (1992) (stating “[t]he idea that threats to speech come from government is 
correct, but as conventionally understood, it is far too simple. Sometimes 
threats come from what seems to be the private sphere, but those threats are 
fundamentally a product of legal entitlements that enable some private actors 
but not others to speak and to be heard. When this is so, these legal 
entitlements pose a large risk to a system of free expression, one not readily 
visible to current law.”). 
100.  See Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969) (stating 
“[i]t is the right of the viewers and listeners, not the right of the broadcasters, 
which is paramount.  It is the purpose of the First Amendment to preserve an 
uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately prevail, rather 
than to countenance monopolization of that market, whether it be by the 
Government itself or a private licensee. . . . It is the right of the public to receive 
suitable access to social, political, esthetic, moral, and other ideas and 
experiences which is crucial here.”) (citations omitted). 
101.  See generally Sunstein, supra note 99, at 276 (stating “[t]his vision 
of the First Amendment does not stress the autonomy of broadcasters with 
current ownership rights. Instead it emphasizes the need to promote 
democratic self-government by ensuring that people are presented with a 
broad diversity of views about public issues.”). 
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II. Doctrinal Analysis 
 
There is an ongoing effort in the academic literature to find 
an analogy that places platforms in a category with existing 
rules and boundaries, so that we can approach them 
appropriately from a regulatory perspective.102  Candidates for 
this analogy include editors, newspapers, broadcasters, cable 
companies, public utilities, monopolies, state actors, and public 
forums.  However, analogies are always imperfect, and there is 
no universal agreement on which of the analogies best suits 
platforms.  Some scholars point out the ways in which the 
platforms’ role is explicitly editorial, thus deserving the highest 
First Amendment protection,103 while others point out how the 
editorial analogy fails and these entities are best thought of as 
cable providers or public utilities.104 
Platforms perform multiple functions and take on different 
roles to do so; if we place platforms in a single category—one 
role, one function—we oversimplify their complex nature.  Only 
by analyzing these roles and functions separately and 
independently from one another, we can come up with a 
regulatory framework that can make sense, both doctrinally and 
normatively.  Legal frameworks that apply to some of these 
functions do not apply to other functions.  In some cases, the 
platforms’ algorithms perform (something like) an editorial 
function resembling a newspaper editor’s judgment about what 
to publish and what not to publish.105  Those types of algorithms 
 
102.  See Whitney, supra note 10, at 30. 
103.  See generally Eric Goldman, Of Course the First Amendment Protects 
Google and Facebook (and It’s Not a Close Question), KNIGHT FIRST AMENDMENT 
INST. (Feb. 2018), https://knightcolumbia.org/content/course-first-amendment-
protects-google-and-facebook-and-its-not-close-question. 
104.  See generally Danah Boyd, Facebook Is a Utility; Utilities Get 
Regulated, DANAH BOYD: APOPHENIA (May 15, 2010), http://www.zephoria.org 
/thoughts/archives/2010/05/15/facebook-is-a-utility-utilities-get-
regulated.html; K. Sabeel Rahman, Monopoly Men, BOS. REV. (Oct. 11, 2017), 
http://bostonreview.net/science-nature/k-sabeel-rahman-monopoly-men; Cale 
Guthrie Weissman, Maybe It’s Time to Treat Facebook Like a Public Utility, 
FAST COMPANY (May 1, 2017), https://www.fastcompany.com/40414024/ 
maybe-its-time-to-treat-facebook-like-a-public-utility. 
105.  Zhang v. Baidu.com, Inc., 10 F. Supp. 3d 433, 438–39 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) 
(finding the same for search engines); see also e-ventures Worldwide, LLC v. 
Google, Inc., Case No. 2:14–cv–646–FtM–PAM–CM, 2017 WL 2210029, at *4 
(M.D. Fla. Feb. 8, 2017).  
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cannot and should not be regulated.  In other cases, their 
algorithms perform functions that are not editorial; the First 
Amendment should not preclude us from regulating those to an 
extent.  However, if we try to place platforms in strictly defined 
categories, we will be solving one issue and creating another. 
This is why the distinction between content navigation 
algorithms and algorithms that implement the platforms’ 
content moderation policies is so important.  The algorithms that 
implement content moderation policies can be viewed as being 
the closest to the editorial analogy, arguably deserving First 
Amendment protection.106  On the other hand, the content 
navigation algorithms can be viewed as non-speech for First 
Amendment purposes.  Further, even if we were to view content 
navigating algorithms as some type of protected speech, it is 
argues that this would be non-political speech and, therefore, 
less problematic to regulate. 
Before diving into the doctrinal analysis however, a 
clarification is in order: while it may seem counterintuitive, the 
idea that computer code is a type of speech has received 
considerable support.107  But what do we mean when we say that 
an algorithm is protected speech for First Amendment purposes?  
Whose speech is that?  As Tim Wu has observed: “computers 
make trillions of invisible decisions each day; the possibility that 
each decision could be protected speech should give us pause.”108  
Machine speech and the rights of robots are now topics that have 
entered the public debate,109 but in the context of this paper, 
what is examined is whether the algorithms embody the 
expression of their designers in a way that deserves 
constitutional protection.  A book embodies the expression of its 
 
106.  To be clear, I am not advocating for First Amendment protection in 
the case of content moderation; I am simply refraining from arguing that the 
First Amendment does not apply. 
107.  See generally Eugene Volokh & Donald M. Falk, Google: First 
Amendment Protection for Search Engine Search Results, 8 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 
883 (2012); see also Goldman, supra note 103. 
108.  Tim Wu, Free Speech for Computers?, N.Y. TIMES (June 19, 2012), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/20/opinion/free-speech-for-computers.html. 
109.  Tim Wu, Machine Speech, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1495, 1496 (2013); see 
generally James Grimmelmann, Speech Engines, 98 MINN. L. REV. 868 (2014); 
Toni M. Massaro, Helen Norton & Margot E. Kaminski, Siri-ously 2.0: What 
Artificial Intelligence Reveals About the First Amendment, 101 MINN. L. REV. 
2481 (2017). 
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author and, as such, it is protected speech; can we say the same 
of an algorithm? 
As is the case with most hard questions, the answer is: it 
depends; sometimes yes and sometimes no.  As Jack Balkin 
points out, the deeper issue is “whether companies will be able 
to shield themselves from regulation by claiming that their uses 
of AI agents, robots, and algorithms are First Amendment 
protected activities.”110  Ultimately, what we are trying to figure 
out is “which business practices are shielded—and should be 
shielded—from government regulation.”111 
The next two sections address the two types of algorithms 
that platforms use to curate content separately—moderation vs 
navigation—and elaborate on the reasoning for treating them 
differently.112  The section that follows makes a further 
argument limited to personalization algorithms, which is that 
personalization algorithms may not even deserve the limited 
protections available for non-political protected speech, as they 
are better categorized as professional or commercial 
communications that fall outside the First Amendment 
protection altogether.113 
 
A. Content Moderation Policies and Section 230 of the 
Communications Decency Act 
 
Content-moderating practices that monitor for unlawful or 
other undesirable content are viewed as falling under the realm 
of Section 230,114 giving platforms the freedom to moderate 
content without facing risks of liability.  There is a big debate 
around Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act 
(“CDA”), its effect on online speech, and its desirability; however, 
in the context of this paper, it suffices to explain its origins and 
perceived purpose.  The main idea is that online intermediaries 
are not considered publishers or speakers of information 
provided by “another information content provider.”115  In other 
 
110.  Balkin, supra note 98, at 1159. 
111.  Id. at 1160. 
112.  See infra Parts II(A), (B). 
113.  See infra Part II(C). 
114.  47 U.S.C. § 230 (2012). 
115.  Id. 
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words, they are not liable for user-generated content.  The 
reasoning is that if the intermediaries could be found liable for 
defamatory content posted by a user, they would have to take an 
active role in policing their users’ content and would naturally 
err on the side of censorship.  That was seen as a danger to 
freedom of speech online, and Section 230 prevented that from 
happening.  Because of the ways publisher and intermediary are 
defined, Section 230 goes even further, so as to protect the good 
Samaritans that actually try to take some precautions against 
defamatory content. 
Regardless of whether this is good or bad law, the end result 
is that platforms, as online intermediaries, while not obligated 
to monitor and police content provided by others using the 
platform, are at the same time free to do so under their own 
rules.  Recent accounts by commentators illustrate just how 
closely these moderation systems resemble a “legal system;” they 
curate user content “with an eye to American free speech norms, 
[and] corporate responsibility.”116  Yet they operate outside of the 
boundaries of the law per se.  At their core, platforms are driven 
by their economic interests, which dictate a “necessity [to] 
creat[e] an environment that reflects the expectations of their 
users.”117 
One could argue that the fact that Section 230 grants 
immunity from liability to the good Samaritans is not 
tantamount to a First Amendment right of free expression.  Just 
because platforms are not liable as publishers for the content 
they moderate, it does not necessarily follow that their 
moderation practices deserve constitutional protection.  
However, out of all the different functions that machine-learning 
algorithms perform, these content moderation algorithms are 
the closest to an editorial function.  Recall that content 
moderation algorithms determine whether content is allowed to 
exist on the platform, as opposed to where it is placed and how 
it is promoted, which is the subject of content navigation.  The 
decision whether to allow or disallow content is based on the 
substance and the message of the content, not on clicks or other 
metrics.  Humans are continuously involved in this process, and 
 
116.  Klonick, supra note 22, at 1599, 1664. 
117.  Id. at 1599, 1602, 1669. 
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they sometimes override the algorithms.118  Platforms are 
choosing the type of content that reflects the environment they 
want to create; interfering with this process can be seen as a 
close analogy to compelled speech.119 
In fact, two lower courts’ decisions have come to this 
conclusion in the context of search engines where Baidu and 
Google had delisted websites from their search results.  The idea 
is that, just as the First Amendment protects newspaper editors 
who cannot be compelled to publish a particular content item, 
the same concept applies to search engines, which cannot be 
compelled to include certain links.120  The decisions of search 
engines to list or delist content as part of their index is the 
closest equivalent to content moderation policies of social media 
platforms; they both deal with the question of  whether content 
is allowed to exist—on the index or the platform.  Both in Zhang 
v. Baidu.com, Inc.121 and in e-ventures Worldwide, LLC v. 
Google, Inc.,122  the Courts considered Miami Herald Publishing 
Co. v. Tornillo to be the governing precedent; a case where the 
Supreme Court held that requiring newspapers to provide a 
right to reply to political candidates constituted compelled 
speech and was unconstitutional.123  In e-ventures, the Court 
found that “[a] search engine is akin to a publisher, whose 
judgments about what to publish and what not to publish are 
absolutely protected by the First Amendment.”124  Google has 
also won lawsuits on free expression grounds against claims that 
challenged its choice of which advertisements  to  display.125  In  
Langdon v. Google, Inc.,  the District Court  rejected a claim that  
Google had a duty to carry  specific advertisements, and again 
found that Google’s advertising decisions were similar to those 
 
118.  See generally id. 
119.  See Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 252 (1974). 
120.  See generally Volokh & Falk, supra note 107. 
121.  10 F. Supp. 3d 433, 436 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). 
122.  Case No. 2:14–cv–646–FtM–PAM–CM, 2017 WL 2210029, at *3–4 
(M.D. Fla. Feb. 8, 2017). 
123.  Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 258. 
124.  e-ventures, 2017 WL 2210029, at *4 (citing Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 258). 
125.  See generally Langdon v. Google, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 2d 622 (D. Del. 
2007) (displaying the ease with which lower courts have applied the editorial 
analogy).  I am noting that advertising decisions are of course different than 
decisions about listing/delisting content. 
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of a newspaper and, as such, could not be regulated.126 
Scholars have questioned the logic of these decisions.  Frank 
Pasquale notably views the courts’ reliance on Tornillo as 
misguided and argues that there is a difference between trying 
to advertise in one out of hundreds of newspapers versus in the 
one dominant search engine.127  For Pasquale, to the extent that 
Google is a media entity, it is closer to the entities subject to the 
fairness doctrine in Red Lion;128 he sees a need to ensure 
“platform neutrality” in order to prevent intermediaries from 
distorting the public sphere or private commerce by virtue of 
their size and dominant position.129 
Social media platforms’ content moderation decisions may 
or may not be distinguishable from search engines’ listing, 
delisting, and choice-of-advertisement decisions.  The functions 
are not identical, but, for now, these are the closest judicial takes 
on hosting decisions.  Lower courts have been quick to apply the 
editorial analogy, finding that search engines’ decisions on what 
content to list or delist, or which advertisements to carry, are 
similar to a publisher’s decisions about what to publish and, 
therefore, fully protected by the First Amendment. 
While there are arguments that support the opposite 
conclusion130 and the platforms repeatedly make a point to 
disassociate themselves from the idea that they are acting as 
editors or newspapers, ultimately, it may be best from a policy 
perspective not to interfere with the way content moderation 
systems work.  If, for instance, we viewed them as state actors 
whose users had First Amendment rights, as adopting a 
different analogy would suggest, the result would be that 
platforms would be unable to police spam.  They could be quickly 
overwhelmed by other undesirable content and to avoid “mass 
exodus” of their users they would probably redesign their 
algorithms in a way that is explicitly more editorial so that they 
 
126.  Id. at 630 (citing Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 256). 
127.  Frank A. Pasquale, Platform Neutrality: Enhancing Freedom of 
Expression in Spheres of Private Power, 17 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 487, 502–
03 (2016). 
128.  Id. at 503; see generally Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 
(1969). 
129.  Pasquale, supra note 127, at 489. 
130. See Whitney, supra note 10, at 8–13 (discussing the internal 
weaknesses of the editorial analogy). 
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can claim First Amendment protection.131  However, doing so 
would take them outside of the realm of Section 230, and, in 
order to avoid liability for third party content, they would err on 
the side of caution and censorship. Alternatively, if the 
government were to dictate specific rules for content moderation 
(for example, fake news is illegal and should be banned), then 
we have the government in the position of deciding what is fake, 
resulting in indirect censorship because of its chilling effect. 
So, regardless of which analogy applies best for First 
Amendment purposes, it is not suggested that regulators 
interfere with the content moderation systems.  Even if we could 
agree on the analogy in this context today, it may not apply 
tomorrow.  Going back to Lessig’s point on the plasticity of the 
architecture of cyberspace,132 platforms can very easily change 
the code and make today’s analogy inapplicable tomorrow. 
The next section discusses content navigation algorithms, 
and argues that they should be subject to different treatment 
and analysis. 
 
B. Content Navigation Algorithms in General 
 
Content navigation algorithms can be described as machine-
learning algorithms that continuously adjust themselves based 
on new data inputs. These types of algorithms should not qualify 
as speech for First Amendment purposes and, even if they do, 
they are lower value speech as opposed to political speech.  As 
such, any government regulation that addresses them should be 
assessed under a lower standard of scrutiny. 
In terms of judicial precedent, the notion that the First 
Amendment protects content navigation code has again been 
made in the context of Google’s search algorithm.  The search 
algorithm is the closest equivalent to platform’s content 
navigation algorithms because the question it addresses is not 
whether content exists, but rather where it is placed and 
whether the user’s attention is directed to it.  In Search King, 
Inc. v. Google Technology, Inc.,133 the District Court was faced 
 
131.  Goldman, supra note 103 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
132.  See supra Part I discussion and accompanying footnotes. 
133.  No. CIV-02-1457-M, 2003 WL 21464568, at *1 (W.D. Okla. May 27, 
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with the issue of “whether a representation of the relative 
significance of a web site as it corresponds to a search query is a 
form of protected speech.”134  Google argued that PageRanks are 
subjective opinions, and the Court further accepted that search 
results are analogous to financial ratings.  It then relied on the 
Tenth Circuit’s decision in Moody’s Investor’s Services, where 
Moody’s rating of bonds was found to be “a statement of opinion 
relating to matters of public concern which does not contain a 
provably false factual connotation” and as such received “full 
constitutional protection.”135  Based on the analogy, the Search 
King Court concluded that PageRanks are “opinions of the 
significance of particular web sites as they correspond to a 
search query,” that they “relate to matters of public concern,” 
and because there is “no conceivable way to prove that the 
relative significance assigned to a given web site is false,” 
Google’s PageRanks are entitled to “full constitutional 
protection.”136 
A notable point in the opinion, however, is the Court’s 
emphasis on the subjective nature of the search results as 
opposed to the objective nature of the process performed by the 
algorithm.  The Court used this distinction to place search 
results and not search algorithms within the “protected class of 
speech.”137  In a passage worth quoting in full, the District Judge 
stated: 
 
Here, the process, which involves the application 
of the PageRank algorithm, is objective in nature.  
In contrast, the result, which is the PageRank - or 
the numerical representation of relative 
significance of a particular web site - is 
fundamentally subjective in nature.  This is so 
because every algorithm employed by every 
search engine is different, and will produce a 
 
2003). 
134.  Id. 
135.  Jefferson County Sch. Dist. No. R-1 v. Moody’s Inv’r’s Servs., 175 
F.3d 848, 852 (10th Cir. 1999) (quoting Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 
U.S. 1, 19–20 (1990)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
136.  Search King, 2003 WL 21464568, at *3–4 (quoting Jefferson County, 
175 F.3d at 852) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
137.  Id. at *3. 
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different representation of the relative 
significance of a particular web site depending on 
the various factors, and the weight of the factors, 
used to determine whether a web site corresponds 
to a search query. In the case at bar, it is the 
subjective result, the PageRank, which was 
modified, and which forms the basis for Search 
King’s tort action.138 
 
Regardless of whether this distinction makes conceptual 
sense, it is important in that it clarifies what speech the Search 
King Court felt was deserving of First Amendment protection.  
It was not the search algorithm, which the Court viewed as an 
objective process, but rather the search result, which took 
subjective factors into account.  Following this logic, Search King 
cannot be read as holding that content navigation algorithms 
deserve First Amendment protection because the decision was 
focused solely on the results.  That said, the distinction is not as 
clear-cut as the Court portrays it to be.  The factors and the 
weights of the factors are also, for the most part, products of 
algorithmic calculations.  The more we drill down, the 
distinction between process and result starts fading, as 
machine-learning algorithms constantly update their process 
based on results. Search King is also just a district court decision; 
so, regardless of the distinction the Court made, we need to take 
a closer look at the First Amendment issues that arise in the 
case of social media platforms. 
As opposed to Google, who has outright argued that 
PageRanks are subjective opinions,139 social media platforms 
have not yet made an argument that their news feeds or 
 
138.  Id. at *3–4. 
139.  See generally id.  Even though Google argues that its PageRanks are 
subjective opinions, it is important to note that it does not take the same 
position with respect to other algorithmic functions it performs, such as its 
auto-complete function for instance.  Instead, Google explicitly states that such 
auto-complete search predictions are not the answers to a search query, but 
rather the terms are predicted by computer algorithms based on searches from 
previous users, not by Google itself.); see also David Meyer, Google Loses 
Autocomplete Defamation Case in Italy, ZDNET (Apr. 5, 2011, 2:13 PM), 
http://www.zdnet.com/article/google-loses-autocomplete-defamation-case-in-
italy/. 
33
ARTICLE 3_GRAFANAKI.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 3/28/2019  1:46 PM 
144 PACE LAW REVIEW Vol. 39.1 
trending news features represent protected speech; they even go 
out of their way to deny any resemblance to an editorial role.  
Notably, Greg Marra, the Facebook engineer whose team 
designs the code that drives Facebook’s News Feed, has plainly 
stated: 
 
We try to explicitly view ourselves as not 
editors . . . We don’t want to have editorial 
judgment over the content that’s in your feed.  
You’ve made your friends, you’ve connected to the 
pages that you want to connect to and you’re the 
best decider for the things that you care about.140 
 
Presumably, platforms take this stance because being 
perceived as editors is a double-edged sword.  If they are editors 
and their algorithms are speech, then it follows that they are 
media companies; but they really do not want to be media 
companies.  They want to be seen as technology companies who 
do not produce any original content, but merely distribute it in 
a neutral way, and whose algorithms simply reflect what users 
want.141 
Regardless of their self-categorization, there is a conceptual 
difference between search engine results and social media news 
feeds.  When people use Google, they are searching for 
something with the expectation of being presented with correct 
and relevant answers to their inputted keywords and queries.  
They may use Google as opposed to Bing because of Google’s 
reputation as a better search engine, and the process resembles 
a type of dialogue where a user actively asks a question and 
expects Google to come up with the best answer.  The user is 
essentially asking Google for its viewpoint on a particular query.  
This dialogue sometimes continues when the user adjusts search 
parameters such as time period.  In that sense Google’s 
 
140.  Ravi Somaiya, How Facebook Is Changing the Way Its Users 
Consume Journalism, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 26, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com 
/2014/10/27/business/media/how-facebook-is-changing-the-way-its-users-
consume-journalism.html. 
141.  See Philip M. Napoli, Sanford Sch. of Pub. Policy, & Robyn Caplan, 
Data & Soc’y Research Inst., When Media Companies Insist They’re Not Media 
Companies and Why It Matters for Communications Policy, (Sept. 30, 2016), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2750148. 
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algorithm can be seen as expressive and somewhat editorial.  
Social media companies, on the other hand, are not perceived 
that way and do not intend to be perceived that way.  They 
explicitly refrain from expressing any viewpoint.  Users do not 
ask Facebook what content Facebook thinks is relevant to them; 
they use Facebook because that is where their friends are.  They 
individually select which friends to connect with and which 
pages to follow, and, when users log on to Facebook, they expect 
to view content updates from the individuals and pages they 
have themselves selected.  The focus is not on Facebook’s 
selection and arrangement of these updates; in fact, this is 
mostly obscured by the company’s statements.142 
Interestingly, in its recent decision, Packingham v. North 
Carolina, the Supreme Court found social media to be “the 
modern public square,” “the most important places (in a spatial 
sense) for the exchange of views” and stated that it is a 
“fundamental principle of the First Amendment . . . that all 
persons have access” to such a forum.143  The context of this case 
was very different, as it concerned a law prohibiting registered 
sex offenders from social networking platforms, but it is the 
analogy the Court drew and the stress on the right of access that 
matters for our purposes.  The Court’s approach suggests that 
the role of these platforms in public discourse is entirely 
different from that of traditional editors and, therefore, should 
not be treated as such for First Amendment purposes.  Requiring 
all persons to have access to a forum is exactly what the 
government cannot do when editors are involved.144 
The editorial speech courts have traditionally protected145 
represents an editor’s judgment about which issues are of public 
importance and a commitment to journalistic ethics.  That is, 
political speech and the First Amendment strongly protects it.  
In the case of Facebook, even if the actual content selected is 
political in nature, the navigation algorithm itself is not.  The 
nature of machine-learning algorithms is such that they are 
 
142.  See Somaiya, supra note 140. 
143.  137 S. Ct. 1730, 1732, 1735, 1737 (2017). 
144.  See generally Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 
(1974). 
145.  See Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 412 U.S. 
94, 120 (1973). 
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constantly changing and adjusting to new inputs in ways that 
are so complex, that they often go beyond the comprehension of 
their designers.  It would be very odd, to say the least, to grant 
the same protection we give to political speech to algorithmic 
processes and outputs that cannot even be explained by their 
own designers. 
There is no particular viewpoint or message embodied in 
these algorithmic processes; the expression they represent is 
driven entirely by clicks and engagement metrics.  They are 
designed to optimize user engagement.  The content of the 
algorithm is constantly changing, and, in the case of 
personalization algorithms, it is not even directed to more than 
one person.  Functionally, this is more like selling than editing.  
Even if the content items that the algorithms filter are political 
in nature, the algorithms themselves are not political speech.  
So, if navigation algorithms are protected speech at all, we need 
to ask what type of protected speech that is.146 
Doctrinally, speech which does no more than “propose a 
commercial transaction”147 or “link . . . a product to a current 
public debate”148 is considered commercial speech and deserves 
a lower degree of constitutional protection.  The classic example 
of commercial speech is advertising, but there have been 
instances where advertising has been considered public 
discourse and instances where expression that is not an 
advertisement has been considered commercial speech.149  
Content navigation algorithms are not a clear example of 
commercial speech, but they do not need to be in order to justify 
lower constitutional protection.  The commercial speech doctrine 
is relevant for our purposes because it illustrates why and how 
the First Amendment protects non-political speech.  Instead of 
 
146.  See Robert Post, Compelled Commercial Speech, 117 W. VA. L. REV. 
867, 871–72 (2015) (arguing that “First Amendment doctrine protects each 
distinct kind of speech in a manner appropriate for safeguarding its particular 
kind of constitutional value. ‘Speech as such’ does not contain any 
constitutional value.” (footnote omitted)). 
147.  See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 
425 U.S. 748, 760 (1976). 
148.  See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 
U.S. 557, 562 n.5 (1980). 
149.  See Robert Post, The Constitutional Status of Commercial Speech, 
48 UCLA L. REV. 1, 5 (2000) (citing Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 
U.S. 60 (1983)); see generally N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
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focusing on which descriptive category of speech content 
navigation algorithms fall under, it is best to focus on the 
constitutional value of the expression in question in order to 
determine whether they deserve constitutional protection at all 
and, if so, to what degree.150 
Scholars like Edwin Baker have argued that commercial 
speech should not be protected at all.151  This approach reflects 
an autonomy theory of free speech, meaning that individual 
liberty and personal agency require speakers to be free to choose 
the content of their own message without interference.  In the 
marketplace, however, speech is dictated by profit-maximizing 
and efficiency standards and, as such, does not represent an 
exercise of freedom.152 
From a slightly different perspective, Robert Post views 
First  Amendment doctrine as having not one single structure, 
but  rather as being plural.153  He explains that  different types 
of speech embody  different constitutional  values and as such, 
each type of speech should receive the protection that is  
appropriate for the values it embodies.154  Ordinary First 
Amendment doctrine, meaning doctrine  concerning  political 
speech, focuses on the speaker.  It  protects the right of the 
speaker  to participate in public discourse and the equal  right  
of  every citizen in a democracy to participate in the formation  
of  public opinion.155  In contrast,  commercial speech is  
protected for the  informational value it provides to the  
listeners, and  commercial speech doctrine is focused on the free 
flow of  information.156  Robert  Post identifies this value as  
“democratic  competence,”  referring to the “cognitive  
empowerment of those who  participate in  public discourse,” 
which   is   achieved  when   listeners   can   receive   information 
  
 
150.  Post, supra note 149, at 11. 
151.  C. Edwin Baker, The First Amendment and Commercial Speech, 84 
IND. L.J. 981, 997 (2009). 
152.  Id. at 986. 
153.  Post, supra note 146, at 871; Robert Post & Amanda Shanor, Adam 
Smith’s First Amendment, 128 HARV. L. REV. F. 165, 181 (2015). 
154.  Post & Shanor, supra note 153, at 181–82. 
155.  Id. at 170. 
156.  Id. (citing First Nat’l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 783 (1978). 
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in order to form their own opinions and make decisions based on 
them.157 
In other words, political speech is speech that is itself part 
of public discourse, and speakers receive the strongest protection 
when they engage in public discourse.  Commercial speech, on 
the other hand, is not itself part of public discourse, but rather 
it facilitates the free flow of information so that participants in 
the public discourse can form their opinions and the content of 
their (political speech) in an informed and intelligent way. 
Against this theoretical background, let us now revisit 
content navigation algorithms.  Even if we accept that content 
navigation algorithms are speech for First Amendment 
purposes, they are certainly not speech that is part of the public 
discourse.  Their function is to facilitate the flow of information 
to listeners.  The listeners are the ones that become speakers 
participating in public discourse; the algorithms are merely 
information conduits.  As such, if they deserve any First 
Amendment protection against regulation, it is because of the 
value they provide to the listeners in delivering information.  
They are different than commercial speech because commercial 
speech is itself the information that has value for the listeners, 
whereas content navigation algorithms are merely the delivery 
mechanism of the information.  However, they are similar in 
that the constitutional focus is on the listeners and the listeners’ 
interest in receiving information. 
As a new category, content navigation algorithms have no 
established legal test which can be applied to potential 
restrictions on them.  The closest applicable test is the test for 
assessing the constitutionality of restrictions on commercial 
speech.  However, courts need not be bound by it, and there is 
no reason to use an already complex and unclear standard for a 
category it was not designed for.  That said, for the purposes of 
this paper, it is useful as an exercise to draw on the commercial 
speech doctrine, as it can highlight the types of issues that will 
arise.  Given that the reasons to grant some level of 
constitutional protection to content navigation algorithms are 
similar to the reasons why we protect commercial speech 
 
157.  Id. at 170 n.35 (citing ROBERT POST, DEMOCRACY EXPERTISE, AND 
ACADEMIC FREEDOM: A FIRST AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE FOR THE MODERN 
STATE 27–60 (Yale Univ. Press 2012)). 
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(meaning, the informational value it has for the listeners), any 
new test would presumably draw on ideas similar to those 
embodied in the test for commercial speech. 
The leading case that establishes the test for the 
constitutionality of restrictions on commercial speech is Central 
Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission of 
New York, which lays out a four-prong test.158  First, for the 
commercial expression to be eligible for First Amendment 
protection, it must concern lawful activity and not be 
misleading.159  Second, it must be determined whether the 
government interest to be served by the restriction on 
commercial speech is substantial.160  Third, we ask whether the 
regulation directly advances the governmental interest asserted; 
and fourth, whether it is not more extensive than is necessary to 
serve that interest.161 
Let us now apply the Central Hudson test to the content 
navigation algorithms of social media platforms.  If we assume 
that the algorithms qualify for protection under the first 
prong,162 we then have to articulate the government interest 
that the regulation would assert and determine if it is a 
substantial interest.  Enhancing welfare is typically considered 
a substantial government interest,163 and the connection 
between the circulation of information and welfare is precisely 
why the doctrine of commercial speech exists.164  Therefore, 
 
158.  447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980). 
159.  Id. 
160.  Id. 
161.  Id. 
162.  There is an argument to be made that these algorithms are actually 
misleading and, as such, do not even qualify for limited First Amendment 
protection available to commercial speech.  Selecting fake news items as 
trending or as relevant to a user may be very misleading, but ultimately that 
depends on what the algorithms are perceived to do.  Because this part of the 
test can go both ways depending on interpretation, I proceed to examine the 
remaining three prongs as well. 
163.   See Post, supra note 146, at 891. 
164.  See id. (quoting Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer 
Council, 425 U.S. 748, 760, 765 (1976) (stating “[s]o long as we preserve a 
predominantly free enterprise economy, the allocation of our resources in large 
measure will be made through numerous private economic decisions. It is a 
matter of public interest that those decisions, in the aggregate, be intelligent 
and well informed. To this end, the free flow of commercial information is 
indispensable.”). 
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regulating content navigation algorithms in a way that promotes 
the free flow of information and encourages the existence of a 
functioning marketplace of ideas is perfectly constitutional.  
Doing so promotes true autonomous choice in the selection and 
consumption of content and the ability to make intelligent and 
informed decisions.  As such, it is aligned with the prerequisites 
for a “free enterprise economy”165 and with the requirements for 
citizens in a democratic society to be able to perform their civic 
duties, and is, therefore, welfare enhancing. 
This leaves us with the last two prongs of the Central 
Hudson test: whether the regulation directly advances the 
governmental interest asserted, and whether it is more 
extensive than necessary to promote that interest.166  The 
assessment of the last two prongs must be done against the 
precise language of the regulation, and designing it is inevitably 
a multi-disciplinary task requiring the collaboration of 
platforms, engineers, academics, and regulators.  However, to 
illustrate the viability and constitutionality of regulation, an 
example of the types of requirements that could be imposed on 
the content navigation algorithms is offered.  We can imagine, 
for instance, a requirement that trending topic algorithms 
exclude bot activity from measures of what is trending,167 or a 
requirement that algorithms treat links that are shared, but 
unopened, differently from links that have actually been opened.  
We can also imagine a requirement that content that originated 
from an ad, even if subsequently shared organically, cannot be 
included in popularity measures of news; or a requirement to 
exclude from the news feed algorithms information on how users 
interact with ads.168  These are merely examples, because any 
 
165.   Id. at 891 (citing Va. State Bd., 425 U.S. at 765). 
166.  Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557 
(1980). 
167.  This is in fact a step that platforms have purported to initiate on 
their own: See Colin Crowell, Our Approach to Bots and Misinformation, 
TWITTER: BLOG (June 14, 2017), https://blog.twitter.com /official/en_us/topics 
/company/2017/Our-Approach-Bots-Misinformation.html; Jen Weedon et al., 
Information Operations and Facebook, FACEBOOK (2017), https://fbnews 
roomus.files.wordpress.com/2017/04/facebook-and-information-operations-
v1.pdf. 
168.  See McGee, supra note 74 (noting that while “the News Feed 
algorithm is completely separate from the algorithm that decides what ads to 
show, when to show ads, and where to show them[,] . . . how a user interacts 
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regulatory proposal has to be the product of systematic 
interdisciplinary research that evaluates not only the issues, but 
also the potential effectiveness of the interventions.  What the 
preceding analysis simply illustrates is that the First 
Amendment does not prohibit such regulatory intervention. 
 
C. The Special Case of Personalization: Protected Speech v. 
Commercial Communications 
 
The preceding discussion relates to content navigation 
algorithms used by social media platforms in general; it includes 
both algorithms that select content that is trending and 
personalization algorithms and argues that regulating them can 
be consistent with First Amendment doctrine.  This Section will 
further argue that personalization algorithms specifically may 
not even deserve the limited constitutional protections of the 
type afforded to non-political speech. 
To understand how to draw the boundaries between 
different types of speech, it is again illustrative to look at the 
commercial speech doctrine.  The category of commercial speech 
is defined by two boundaries: the first distinguishes it from 
public discourse, which is what has been discussed above, and 
the second falls on the other side of the spectrum and 
distinguishes commercial speech from other types of 
communications that do not receive any of the constitutional 
protections afforded to commercial speech.169 
Doctrinally, core First Amendment protection involves 
political speech, meaning speech that is part of the public 
discourse.  Non-political speech such as commercial speech, 
which gets limited protection, involves speech that conveys 
information to those participating in public discourse.  Left 
unprotected are “those forms of commercial communications 
that do not serve to underwrite a public communicative 
sphere.”170  Robert Post’s work can again shed light to this 
distinction.  He points out that, for sociologists, this public 
communicative sphere consists of a shared “universe of 
 
with Facebook ads can influence what shows in the News Feed”). 
169.   See Post, supra note 149, at 15–25. 
170.   Id. at 22. 
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discourse” which exposes strangers presumed to be 
“independent and rational” to “similar social stimuli.”171  To 
illustrate what falls outside of this public communicative sphere, 
Post uses the paradigmatic example of fiduciary relationships, 
such as the relationship of lawyers with their clients or doctors 
with their patients, which even though involve the conveying of 
information, can be regulated without involving the First 
Amendment commercial speech doctrine.  He suggests that 
there are implicit assumptions within the doctrine that 
distinguish between personal communications which constitute 
relationships of dependence and reliance and impersonal 
communications addressed to independent and rational 
citizens.172 
Personalization algorithms may not be the paradigmatic 
example of fiduciary relationships of dependence and reliance. 
That said, scholars have suggested that certain types of online 
service providers take on fiduciary responsibilities in the digital 
age.  Neil Richards and Jack Balkin have both written on the 
concept of information fiduciaries in the digital age, arguing that 
online service providers have a unique relationship with end-
users that placed users in a position of dependence and 
vulnerability.173  These relationships, they claim, are not 
identical to the traditional kinds of fiduciaries, such as lawyers 
and doctors, that would require the strictest fiduciary 
obligations, but the law should recognize new kinds of fiduciary 
relations and obligations that correspond to the respective user-
entity relationship.174 
 
171.  Id. (citing JOHN W. BENNETT & MELVIN M. TUMIN, SOCIAL LIFE: 
STRUCTURE AND FUNCTION: AN INTRODUCTORY GENERAL SOCIOLOGY 140 (Knopf 
1948); Carroll D. Clark, The Concept of the Public, 13 SW. SOC. SCI. Q. 311, 313 
(1933); Robert Post, Recuperating First Amendment Doctrine, 47 STAN. L. REV. 
1249, 1276 (1995)). 
172.  Post, supra note 149, at 24. 
173.  See NEIL RICHARDS, INTELLECTUAL PRIVACY: RETHINKING CIVIL 
LIBERTIES IN THE DIGITAL AGE ch. 10 (Oxford Univ. Press 2015); Jack M. Balkin, 
Information Fiduciaries and the First Amendment, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1183, 
1221–22 (2016). 
174.  Balkin, supra note 173, at 1223 (stating “we should recognize that a 
changing society generates new kinds of fiduciary relations and fiduciary 
obligations that the law can and should recognize. The scope of the fiduciary 
duty, however, is not the same for every entity. It depends on the nature of the 
relationship, the reasonableness of trust, and the importance of preventing 
self-dealing by the entity and harm to the end-user, client, or beneficiary.”); see 
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To be clear, this Article is not suggesting that the special 
duties of the information fiduciaries of the digital age extend to 
the way personalization algorithms work.  Both Balkin and 
Richards are mostly focused on privacy and the handling of 
personal information when they talk about these new fiduciary 
obligations.  This Article is however suggesting, that the nature 
of the relationship between platforms and individual end-users 
implies that communications in the context of this relationship 
fall outside of public discourse altogether.  In other words, these 
communications should not even receive the limited protections 
available to non-political speech, such as commercial speech. 
In Lowe v. SEC for instance, the Court found that 
“personalized communications create special dangers of ‘fraud, 
deception, or overreaching’ that ‘are not replicated in 
publications that are advertised and sold in an open market,’” 
and found that Congress can treat investment advisors as 
fiduciaries consistent with the First Amendment.175  Regardless 
of whether fiduciary responsibilities should be imposed on 
platforms, what is argued is that, on the personalized level, they 
perform a function that falls outside the realm of constitutional 
speech protections.  This is especially so when there are reasons 
to doubt the autonomy of the listeners.176 
 
 
also RICHARDS, supra note 173, at 168 (stating “[j]ust as we recognized in the 
past that certain professionals were fiduciaries of our information, so, too, in 
the Age of Information should we expand our definition of information 
fiduciaries to include bookstores, search engines, ISPs, email providers, cloud 
storage services, providers of physical and streamed video, and websites and 
social networks when they deal in our intellectual data. The duties of 
confidentiality we place on these fiduciaries need not be ironclad. Sometimes 
we want to share our views with the world, and intermediaries can help to do 
that, too. But that should be our choice, not theirs.”). 
175.  See Balkin, supra note 173, at 1219 (citing Lowe v. SEC, 472 U.S. 
181, 210 (1985).  Jack Balkin clarifies that the Court did not say that 
investment advisors must be treated as fiduciaries, but simply said that the 
First Amendment does not preempt Congress from doing so.  Id. 
176.  See Post, supra note 149, at 41 (offering yet another approach for 
why these types of fiduciary relationships do not deserve First Amendment 
protection, viewing them as failing the first prong of the Central Hudson test 
(i.e. the misleading requirement), and suggesting that the requirement should 
be redefined “to focus on the specific conditions that might be understood to 
render consumers dependent and vulnerable,” rather than focusing on the 
content of speech). 
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Let us recall the Facebook social contagion experiment, 
which caused an outrage in 2012.177  For a week in January 2012, 
the feeds of about 700,000 Facebook users were manipulated to 
determine how users’ emotional states change depending on the 
nature of the posts they see.178  Some users saw content with a 
preponderance of happy and positive words, while others saw 
content that was considered sadder than average.179  At the end 
of the week, these users were more likely to post content that 
corresponded to the type they had been exposed to, that is 
especially positive or negative words.180  The experiment 
concluded that “emotional states can be transferred to others via 
emotional contagion, leading people to experience the same 
emotions without their awareness,” and that “emotional 
contagion occurs without direct interaction between people 
(exposure to a friend expressing an emotion is sufficient), and in 
the complete absence of nonverbal cues.”181  Despite the public 
outrage, what Facebook allowed to happen on its platform was 
probably legal. If so, that would be because of a contractual 
relationship between Facebook and each user established 
through terms of service and privacy policies.  It is not because 
Facebook has some First Amendment right bestowed upon its 
News Feed. 
The fact is that the proliferation of content coupled with the 
information asymmetries of the attention economy places users 
of social media platforms in a position of disadvantage and 
relative dependence on the platforms.  There is so much content 
out there that individuals do not have the time or attention span 
to actively select what they engage with, given the plethora of 
available choices.  Curators are needed more than ever, and 
 
177.  See Kate Crawford, The Test We Can—and Should—Run on 
Facebook, ATLANTIC (July 2, 2014), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology 
/archive/2014/07/the-test-we-canand-shouldrun-on-facebook/373819/; see also 
Robinson Meyer, Everything We Know About Facebook’s Secret Mood 
Manipulation Experiment, ATLANTIC (June 28, 2014), https://www.theatlantic 
.com/technology/archive/2014/06/everything-we-know-about-facebooks-secret-
mood-manipulation-experiment/373648/. 
178.  See Adam D. I. Kramer et al., Experimental Evidence of Massive-
Scale Emotional Contagion Through Social Networks, 111 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. 
SCI. U.S. AM. 8788, 8788 (2014). 
179.  Id. 
180.  Id. 
181.  Id. 
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unlike search engines users that search for something specific, 
social media platform users tend to passively consume content 
that makes it on their news feeds.  The platforms claim that they 
are giving users what they want, so why, one would ask, is there 
anything problematic here?  Haven’t people always chosen to 
read the newspaper or watch the TV channel that corresponds 
to their political beliefs?  It is not suggested that we need 
paternalistic guidance on what we should be reading, nor that 
the government is a better judge than the platforms of that is.  
What is suggested, however, is that personalization is not quite 
the same as a man choosing to read his party’s newspaper; it 
represents a different knowledge logic.182 
In personalized news feeds, user preferences are implied 
based on factors that are opaque.  At a minimum, they include 
actual data the platform has on the individual, presumably with 
the individual’s consent.183  But they also include inferences that 
platforms make about the users, which may or may not be 
accurate.  These isolated points of information (actual data and 
inferences) are used to construct what has been called our “data 
doubles”184 or “shadow bodies,” which emphasize some 
characteristics (in the form of data points), and overlook 
others.185  What is emphasized, what is excluded, and, most 
importantly, why things are emphasized or excluded, is unclear.  
 
182.  See supra note 58 and accompanying text. 
183.  Though meaningful consent to data collection is at best debatable. 
See Katherine J. Strandburg, Free Fall: The Online Market’s Consumer 
Preference Disconnect, 2013 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 95, 133 (2013) (stating “[f]irst, 
users lack information about the types of harms that may arise from data 
collection, the prevalence of those harms, and their costs. Second, users lack 
detailed and useful information about company practices involving data 
collection, storage, and use. Third, users lack information about how any given 
instance of data collection fits into the data about them that is already flowing 
in the online ecosystem. Without these three types of information, Internet 
users cannot make meaningful assessments of the marginal expected disutility 
of any given use of an online product or service. Even if they had the necessary 
information, bounded capacity for information processing and bounded 
rationality would interfere with their ability to assess their expected disutility 
and compare it to the expected utility of a given online product or service.”). 
184.  See Kevin D. Haggerty & Richard V. Ericson, The Surveillant 
Assemblage, 51 BRIT. J. SOC. 605, 606 (2000).  
185.  See Gillespie, supra note 26, at 174 (referring to Ellen Balka and 
noting that “the slippage between anticipated user [reflected in the shadow 
bodies] and the user themselves that they represent can be either politically 
problematic, or politically productive”). 
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These “sufficient[ly] approximat[e]”186 digital versions of 
ourselves are compared with sufficiently approximate digital 
versions of others to determine who “people like us” are and to 
identify content these “people like us” have engaged with.  Some 
version of that content is what ultimately makes it on our news 
feeds and supposedly represents what we want to see. 
A previous article has developed a complete account of why 
personalization algorithms undermine individual autonomy and 
do not represent users’ true choice in the selection of content.187  
What this Article now seeks to add, is that this asymmetrical  
relationship—in terms of information and power—between 
platforms and their users is exactly what may disqualify them 
from even limited protections of First Amendment doctrine.  If 
this analysis is correct, regulation of personalization algorithms 
would not even need to pass the Central Hudson test, or any 
other equivalent test which may be developed for the new 
category of content navigation algorithms. 
The algorithmic knowledge logic of personalized news feeds 
refers to and produces a type of public that is different than the 
one that is the subject of First Amendment doctrine.  Traditional 
newspapers perform a function in the public sphere by uniting 
strangers via exposure to common texts.188  These strangers 
become a public, capable of possessing an opinion and bringing 
self-government to life.189  This traditional public, brought to life 
by the printed word, “need not be especially rational, . . . [b]ut it 
must exist in the imagination of a population.”190  The look-alike 
publics that personalization algorithms refer to, however, are 
“calculated publics,” that did not exist until the platform’s 
determined their members are alike.191  They are discrete sets of 
users that are transformed into an audience, and only the 
platforms know its precise membership.192  At some level of 
abstraction, these are strangers that already have the same 
opinions and endorse the same texts: people like us.  However, 
 
186.  Id. at 174. 
187.  See Grafanaki, supra note 73; see also Grafanaki, supra note 91. 
188.  See Post, supra note 56, at 1018. 
189.  See id. 
190.  Id. at 1018–19. 
191.  Gillespie, supra note 26, at 188–189. 
192.  Id. at 189. 
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unlike the viewers of Fox News and MSNBC, or the readers of 
the same partisan newspapers, these algorithmic publics may 
sound intuitive in their description, but are completely opaque 
in practice; “these algorithmically generated groups may overlap 
with, be an inexact approximation of, or have nothing 
whatsoever to do with the publics that the user sought out.”193 
 
III. Beyond Content Navigation 
 
A. Platform Interface Design: Other Ways to Regulate the  
 Architecture 
 
In the context of platforms, besides code that functions as 
content curation (whether done through content moderation 
systems or through content navigation algorithms), there are 
also other elements of the architecture that affect the conditions 
of online speech and can be regulated. 
These deserve a separate and complete analysis, but let us 
briefly touch upon one such element in this section: platform 
interface design.194  This type of code should be the least 
problematic to regulate.  In the context of First Amendment 
doctrine, such regulation would resemble content-neutral time-
place-manner restrictions, which can be perfectly constitutional.  
An example will help illustrate: If we look at the way the 
Facebook’s News Feed is currently designed, sponsored content 
appears on a user’s feed exactly the same way content from 
sources the user follows appears, but for the words suggested 
post on the top-left in light grey font.  Sometimes the prominent 
headline is  that a user’s  friend  likes  a page or a post,  but this  
 
193.  See id. 
194.  See Gillespie, supra note 26, at 177 (contrasting the early concerns 
of blending advertisements and organic content with the current concerns that 
are multidimensional and noting that “the landscape of the Facebook News 
Feed . . . can no longer be described as two distinct territories, social and 
commercial; rather, it interweaves the results of algorithmic calculations (what 
status updates and other activities of friends should be listed in the feed, what 
links will be recommended to this user, which friends are actively on the site 
at the moment), structural elements (tools for contributing a status update, 
commenting on an information element, links to groups and pages), and 
elements placed there based on a sponsorship relationship (banner ads, apps 
from third-party sites)”). 
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can either be an organic post or a sponsored post.  While the 
content is labeled, the label itself is almost designed to integrate 
into the post in a way that goes unnoticed.195  Platforms are 
making money from the sponsored or suggested posts but not 
from organic posts, and the more clicks or eyeballs the paid 
content gets, the better for their bottom line. 
We can imagine a regulation requiring platforms to clearly 
separate organic content from sponsored content, not by simply 
labeling the post, but by having paid content appear at different 
parts of the screen.  This would ensure that readers (the public) 
are not confusing the origins of content and do not, or cannot, 
share paid content the same way they can share other types of 
content.  The effect of such a regulation could have a major 
impact for problems like fake news, without even addressing the 
actual content. 
 
B. Market Forces and Platform Self–Regulation 
 
“The radio . . . is a mighty force for breaking . . . 
down [those qualities upon which the enterprise 
of self-government depends]. . . . And that 
catastrophe . . .  reveals how hollow may be the 
victories of the freedom of speech when our 
acceptance of the principle is merely formalistic.  
Misguided by that formalism we Americans have 
given to the doctrine merely its negative meaning.  
We have used it for the protection of private, 
possessive interests with which it has no concern.  
It is misinterpretations such as this which, in our 
use of the radio, the moving picture, the 
newspaper   and  other   forms  of  publication,  are 
 
 
 
 
 
195.  See Craig Silverman et al., In Spite of the Crackdown, Fake News 
Publishers Are Still Earning Money From Major Ad Networks, BUZZFEED NEWS 
(Apr. 4, 2017, 9:05 AM), https://www.buzzfeed.com/craigsilverman /fake-news-
real-ads?utm_term=.gggB4Wmw5#.tmj8lAZMV; see also Syed, supra note 48, 
at 353.  
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 giving the name ‘freedoms’ to the most flagrant 
enslavements  of our minds and wills.”196 
 Alexander Meiklejohn, 1948 
 
“Markets are generally good things, both for 
ordinary products and for speech. But when the 
legal creation of a market has harmful 
consequences for free expression - and it 
sometimes does - then we must reevaluate it in 
light of free speech principles.”197 
Cass Sunstein, 1990 
 
These passages are quoted to illustrate that the idea of a 
market failure in the context of markets for information about 
public affairs is not novel.  This is not an area where we can 
expect the market to correct itself; nor can we rely on the 
platforms to self-regulate.  The conflicts of interest and 
information asymmetries are such that we are faced with a 
market failure.  What drives markets and produces welfare is 
the satisfaction of individual preferences that are exogenous and 
preexist market relations.198  This idea of a market, however, is 
entirely inconsistent with the social and behavioral shaping 
enabled by the platforms’ algorithmic tools.199 
The economic interests of the platforms dictate keeping 
their users happy in order to stay on the platform; such 
incentives are not necessarily aligned with the users’ best 
interests when selecting which content to show them.  For 
example, fake news may be the kind of content that increases 
engagement on a platform.  As long as users do not protest 
against such content and consume it, the economic incentives of 
the platforms would dictate to leave it alone.  Section 230 allows 
 
196.  ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-
GOVERNMENT 104–05  
(Harper & Bros. 1948). 
197.  Sunstein, supra note 99 at 277. 
198.  See generally Yochai Benkler & David D. Clark, Introduction, 145 
DAEDALUS: J. AM. ACAD. ARTS & SCI. 5, 5 (2016). 
199.  See Yochai Benkler, Degrees of Freedom, Dimensions of Power, 145 
DAEDALUS: J. AM. ACAD. ARTS & SCI. 18, 23-24 (2016) (noting that, while a 
critique of markets based on the “endogeneity of preferences” is not a new 
theme, big data has given it new dimensions). 
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them to do so without facing liability risks.200  The economic 
incentives change only when there is enough public concern 
about fake news that can influence user engagement.  The only 
reason why platforms would self-regulate is to proactively avoid 
government regulation.  But despite recurring incidents which 
have caused public outcry, the platforms’ proactive measures 
have proved inadequate every time.201 
Even in cases where the platforms “mistreat” users, the 
market may temporarily punish platforms to an extent, as for 
example happened with the emergence of the #DeleteFacebook 
movement after the Cambridge Analytica story broke, but such 
reactions are not effective deterrents for future misbehavior.202  
In fact, the irony of the #DeleteFacebook movement is that its 
message was spread through the use of hashtags, a filtering tool 
made available by social media platforms themselves.203 
Besides the asymmetries of information and power, scholars 
critique the very idea of “consumer choices” in the context of the 
communications system.204  Cass Sunstein has emphasized the 
distinction between “consumer sovereignty” and “political 
sovereignty,” the former being the idea behind free markets and 
the latter the idea behind free nations.205  As consumers, free 
markets may serve us well; as citizens, however, this is not 
always the case.  Political sovereignty entails the considered 
judgments of the citizens—the aspirations of the public as a 
 
200.  See 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2012). 
201.  See generally Josh Constine, Facebook and the Endless String of 
Worst-Case Scenarios, TECHCRUNCH (Mar. 18, 2018), https://techcrunch.com 
/2018/03/18/move-fast-and-fake-things/. 
202.  See generally Jessica Guynn, Delete Facebook? It’s a Lot More 
Complicated Than That, USA TODAY (Mar. 28, 2018, 3:59 PM), 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/news/2018/03/28/people-really-deleting-
their-facebook-accounts-its-complicated/464109002/. 
203.  See generally Sandra González-Bailón, Want to Change Facebook? 
Don’t Delete Your Account—Use It for Good, QUARTZ (Apr. 4, 2018), 
https://qz.com/1244750/the-delete-facebook-movement-is-ultimately-self-
defeating/. 
204.  See Sunstein, supra note 99, at 287; see also SUNSTEIN, supra note 
30, at 52–57.  
205.  SUNSTEIN, supra note 30, at 52–54 (stating “the notion of consumer 
sovereignty underlies enthusiasm for the Daily me [and] . . . is the 
underpinning of any utopian vision of the unlimited power to filter. . . . The 
notion of political sovereignty underlines the democratic alternative.”). 
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whole206—and, unlike consumer sovereignty, which views 
individuals as having fixed tastes and preferences there to be 
discovered, political sovereignty understands individuals and 
communities as being shaped by the political process.  In the 
context of platforms, the two concepts can get especially blurred.  
The same platform appeals to both our role as consumers, 
expecting to choose exactly as we wish, and to our role as citizens 
of a democratic society, requiring information about public 
affairs. 
 
Conclusion 
 
We cannot respond to the recent fake news crisis by making 
fake news illegal or by holding platforms liable for hosting fake 
news like the Malaysian government recently did.207  However, 
the problem was never in the existence of fake news, a 
phenomenon that has always resided in the fringes of the 
information ecosystem. The recent crisis was a result of the 
current ecosystem’s architecture, which is responsible for the 
way information gets amplified and becomes more persuasive.  
The assertion put forward in this Article is that we should 
regulate certain elements of the underlying architecture, that 
we can do so without doctrinal barriers, and that doing so can 
address some of the problems that the new ecosystem has made 
more salient. 
Today’s information environment has changed the 
conditions of speech.  The new conditions are not aligned with 
the prerequisites for citizens in a democratic society to perform 
their civic duties, and they undermine the notion of true 
autonomous choice in the selection and consumption of content.  
It was therefore argued that certain algorithms used by social 
media platforms to filter content can and should be regulated. 
This argument was primarily structured on a distinction 
between algorithms that filter content for hosting purposes 
versus algorithms that filter content for navigation purposes.  
 
206. Id. at 54 (stating “political sovereignty embodies democratic self-
government, understood as a requirement of ‘government by discussion,’ 
accompanied by reason-giving in the public domain, where different people 
speak with one another and listen respectfully, even when in intense conflict”). 
207.  See supra note 47 and accompanying text. 
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This distinction can help categorize the growing body of 
literature and, most importantly, can describe the limits of the 
First Amendment as a deregulatory tool in this context.  
Doctrinal barriers preempt regulation of platform content 
moderation algorithms, meaning algorithms that implement the 
policies of platforms for deciding to host or censor content items.  
Algorithms that implement content moderation policies are the 
closest to an editorial analogy and, arguably, deserving of full 
First Amendment protection. 
On the other hand, the challenges are not as strong when it 
comes to how platforms facilitate content navigation.  This 
Article firstly argued that content navigation algorithms should 
not be viewed as speech for First Amendment purposes. Further, 
it was argued that even if we were to view content navigating 
algorithms as speech, this should not be political speech that is 
subject to core First Amendment doctrine.  Rather, it should be 
considered a new category of protected speech that falls outside 
the public discourse.  Much like commercial speech, it is less 
problematic to regulate.  Even further, this Article advanced an 
argument limited to personalization algorithms in particular, 
suggesting that these may not even deserve the limited 
protections of the type available to commercial speech, as they 
are better categorized as commercial communications that fall 
outside the protected speech categories altogether. 
Designing a regulatory intervention that can prove effective 
is a complex and challenging task that involves future 
interdisciplinary work.  What this paper demonstrates is that 
the First Amendment is not a barrier to taking on such a task. 
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